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ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Julio Cueto-Rua*
I. INTRODUCTION
On the second day of May, 1855, the Court of Colmar
(France) rendered judgment in the affair Doerr, a suit
brought by the owner of a lot of land on which a house had
been built, against his neighbor who, without any serious and
licit interest, had built a high faked chimney atop his house,
shading and damaging plaintiff's home. Said the court:"... it
is a principle of the law that the right of ownership is, in a
fashion, an absolute right, entitling the owner to abuse of his
thing; however, the exercise of this right, as the exercise of
any other right, ought to be limited by the satisfaction of a
serious and licit interest .... Principles of morals and equity
prevent the court from protecting an action motivated by ill
will, performed under the sway of a wicked passion, which
while not providing any personal benefit to the performer,
causes serious damages to another."1 The court ordered de-
fendant to proceed to eliminate the false chimney he had
built on his property.
Almost at the same time the famous case of the mineral
waters of Saint Galmier was being decided by the Court of
Lyon. In this case the owner of a lot of land, who had drilled a
well, installed a powerful pump and had it continuously work-
ing. Most of the mineral water so pumped ran along the
terrain into a nearby creek, providing no benefit whatsoever
to the owner of the well. However, his neighbor was seriously
hurt by the operation of the pump. The output of his own
well bad been reduced by two-thirds. It was shown that the
unrestricted pumping of the adjoining well seriously di-
minished the volume of underground mineral water. The
plaintiff requested that the defendant be ordered to reduce
the operation of his pump. Defendant argued that article 544
of the French Civil Code recognized absolute rights to the
* Professor of Law, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina; Visiting Pro-
fessor of Law, Louisiana State University spring 1974 and 1975-1976. This
article represents a fuller development and documentation of a seminar dis-
cussion with Louisiana Appellate Judges held on March 7-8, 1974, under the
auspices of the Institute of Civil Law Studies of Louisiana State University
Law School.
1. Colmar, May 2, 1855, D.P. 1856.2.9.
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owner of the land,2 including the right to drill a well and to
operate a pump. He added that whoever exercised his rights
could not be held accountable for the damages caused there-
by: nemo injuria facit qui jure suo utitur.
The Court of Lyon did not share the opinion of defen-
dant; it said that the rights of an owner were limited by his
obligation to let his neighbors enjoy their respective proper-
ties. Therefore, added the court, the power to abuse one's
right cannot justify an act exclusively inspired by the intent
to harm which interfered with the rights of a neighboring
owner to use his own property. The court recalled the tradi-
tional Roman principle, malitiis non est indulgendum, and
applied Civil Code article 1382 which is the normative founda-
tion for the whole system of extra-contractual liability in
France. This prescribes that whoever damages another by his
fault or negligence is bound to redress the injured party.3 The
Court of Lyon confirmed the judgment of the lower court which
had awarded damages to the plaintiff, but reversed its order, by
which defendant had been required to introduce changes in his
pumping operations, and to build certain facilities in order to
prevent further losses. The Court of Lyon reserved its jurisdic-
tion, though, to award further damages were the abusive acts
to continue.4
2. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 544: "La proprit6 est le droit de jouir et de
disposer des choses de la mani~re la plus absolue, pourvue qu'on ne fasse pas
un usage prohibi par les lois ou par les r~glements" (Free English translation:
Property is the right of enjoying and disposing of things in the most absolute
manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by the statutes or
the regulations).
3. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1382: "Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui
cause t autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrive, & le
reparer" (Free English translation: Every act of man whatsoever which
causes damage to another, binds him through whose fault it happened, to
redress thereof). It may be appropriate to point out, at this time, that the
main body of French case-law on abuse of rights is based on article 1382 of the
Code Civil. An article very similar to the French one in its wording may be found
in the Louisiana Civil Code. The first paragraph of its article 2315 reads: "Every
act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault
it happened to repair it." This paragraph was taken by the Louisiana redactors
from article 1382 of the French Civil Code. The first paragraph of article 2294 of
the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code, the direct source of the first paragraph of article
2315 reads: "Tout fait quelconque de l'homme qui cause e autrui un dommage,
oblige celui par lafaute duquel it est arrivg, e le reparer." The Louisiana courts
have not found in the first paragraph of article 2315, the rich content which
French courts have found in French Civil Code article 1382, with reference to
abuse of rights.
4. Lyon, April 18, 1856, D.P. 1856.2.199.
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Thus, one hundred and twenty years ago started in
France a jurisprudential and doctrinal movement in the field of
Property Law which was to expand into other fields of the law
and, then, into most of the civil law jurisdictions, to the point of
becoming a widely accepted principle of the Civil Law.
II. ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS
Common law jurisdictions have, in general, been very
reluctant to follow the path opened by the French courts and
by the great civilian jurists of the continent and the western
hemisphere. In England and in the United States, a different
attitude has prevailed. What may be called rather a strict
interpretation of ownership and contractual rights has led
the courts to accept, and to provide judicial protection to,
actions taken by owners and creditors within the objective
boundaries fixed by law, whatever their motives, even if they
were prompted to act by greed or malice or cruelty.5
A striking instance of this judicial reluctance to introduce
limitations in the exercise of rights of ownership is to'be
found in the leading English case of Mayor, Aldermen and
Burgesses of the Borough of Bradford v. Edward Pickles,6
decided by the House of Lords in 1895. The City of Bradford
owned waterworks and pipes for the distribution of water to
the inhabitants of Bradford. Its main source of water came
from certain springs and streams which arose in, or flowed
through, land owned by the city. Pickles was the owner of a
neighboring tract of land of such structural features that it
was possible for him to reduce or to diminish the flow of water
into the city property by sinking a shaft or driving a level
through the land. In 1892 Pickles began to do this. The City
then sued Pickles seeking an injunction to restrain him from
continuing to sink the shaft or drive the level and from doing
anything whereby the waters of the springs and streams
might be drawn off or diminished in quantity, or polluted, or
injuriously affected.
Pickles alleged that he was doing these works to take
advantage of some minerals although there was evidence
5. Said Justice Wills in Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C.1: "Any right given by
contract may be exercised against the giver by the person to whom it is
granted, no matter how wicked, cruel or mean the motive may be which
determines the enforcement of the right. It is hardly too much to say that
some of the most cruel things that come under the notice of a judge are mere
exercises of a right given by contract."
6. [1895] A.C. 587.
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that his true intent was to put pressure on the City, and then
obtain an attractive price for the sale of his tract of land to it.
The House of Lords, invoking Chasemore v. Richards,7
held that no use of property which would be legal if due to a
proper motive, can become illegal because it is prompted by a
motive which is improper or even malicious. Therefore, it
said, the owner of land containing underground water which
percolates by undefined channels and flows to the land of a
neighbor, has the right to divert or appropriate the percolat-
ing water within his own land so as to deprive his neighbor of
it. And his right is the same, whatever his motives might be,
whether bona fide to improve his own land, or maliciously to
injure his neighbor, or to induce his neighbor to buy him out.
One may venture to say that no French Court would have
allowed Mr. Pickles to have it his way. The same may be said
of almost every civil law jurisdiction. Most likely, Mr. Pickles
would have been enjoined from any attempt to divert the
percolating water by sinking a shaft in his own land. A good
example has been seen in the case of the springs of Saint
Galmier.
Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles is hard law. Gutteridge had
some sharp comments to make about the scope and extent of
the rights recognized by the House of Lords to a "churlish,
selfish, and grasping owner" (in the words of Lord Mac-
naghten). Gutteridge said that English law "has not hesi-
tated to place the seal of its approval upon a theory of the
extent of individual rights which can only be described as the
consecration of the spirit of unrestricted egoism. This is a
conclusion which cannot be regarded with indifference by any
good citizen, and it is somewhat strange that English text-
book writers should apparently accept it with equanimity.","
Several reasons may explain the lack of interest shown
by the common law jurisdictions for the doctrine of abuse of
rights. First of all, it should be said that the doctrine is not
well known by common law lawyers. Research undertaken by
John H. Crabb in 19649 showed a surprisingly limited number
of articles, essays and comments dedicated to abuse of rights.
Crabb mentioned only four law review articles written in
7. 7 H.C.L. 349.
8. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMB. L. J. 22 (1933) [hereinafter cited
as Gutteridge].
9. Crabb, The French Concept of Abuse of Rights, 6 INTERAMERICAN L.
REV. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Crabb].
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English 10 and only one in a Canadian law review, but written
in French.1 The subject did not fare better in law treatises.
Crabb mentioned only three where incidental and occasional
reference is made of abuse of rights.12
In the second place, the doctrine of abuse of rights ap-
pears to shock the common law lawyer, because of the uncer-
tainties which it seems to introduce in the application of
pre-existing rules to cases submitted to the courts for their
decision. It may be said that the doctrine opens the door to
dangerous policies' 3 whereby property and contractual rights
may be subject to limitations and restrictions ex post facto,
disregarding the known rules of the game. There appears to
be a strong feeling against a judicial and doctrinal innovation
which runs directly opposite to the theory which sees in pre-
cedents and stare decisis the most efficacious guarantee
which a state may provide to its citizens against the whims,
the prejudices and the subjective preferences of judges and
jurors.
In the third place, the method of reasoning which leads to
the application of article 1382 of the French Civil Code, the
main normative foundation for the doctrine of abuse of
rights, is rather strange to the common law lawyer. He is
usually amazed when he is told that only five articles of the
French Civil Code (1382 to 1386) were more than sufficient for
the development of the whole field of law concerning damages
caused by negligence, by fault, or by dangerous things. This
area of French law covers grounds which are roughly similar
to those covered by the common law of Torts. The pragmatic,
gradual and specific technique of the common law lawyer
handling legal problems bears little resemblance to the logi-
10. Amos, Abusive Exercise of Rights According to French Law, 2 J.
COMP. LEG. (N.S.) 453 (1900); Catala and Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study in
Parallel (Part II), 38 TUL. L. REV. 221 (1964); Gutteridge at 22, Scholtens,
Abuse of Rights, 75 SO. AFR. L. J. 39 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Scholtens].
Crabb also recalls Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REV. 97 (1908); and
Surveyer, A Comparison of Delictual Responsibility in Law in the Countries
Covered by a Code, 8 TUL. L. REV. 53 (1933), where some incidental treatment
is devoted to the subject. See also Angus, Abuse of Rights in Contractual
Matters in the Province of Quebec, 8 MCGILL L. J. 150 (1962); Mayrand, Abuse
of Rights in France and Quebec, 34 LA. L. REV. 993 (1974); Leake, Abuse of
Rights in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 426 (1933).
11. Mignault, "L'Abus des Droits, 3 U. TORONTO L. J. 360 (1940).
12. W. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY, 355 (2d ed. 1949); H. GUTTERIDGE,
COMPARATIVE LAW, 68 (1946); P. WINFIELD, TORTs 71 (6th ed. Lewis 1954).
13. Gutteridge at 44.
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cal and abstract approach of the civilian. This starts with a
very general proposition and then proceeds to specify it, tak-
ing advantage of the teaching of the jurists. The civilian may
say that while applying statutes or codes to the case, he is
deducing consequences from general legal propositions. In-
stead, the common law lawyer will be inclined to say that by
following precedents he is inferring solutions for the pending
case on the basis of past and accepted experience in similar
cases. It is difficult for a common law lawyer to understand
that, in order to properly construe article 1382 of the French
Civil Code and decide whether abusive acts should fall under
its ruling and be enjoined or cause an award of damages, a
civilian could quote Marcellus, Paulus, Ulpian, the teachings
of Domat and Pothier, and then those of the great commen-
tators of the Code Napoleon like Toullier, Laurent, Duranton,
or Larombi~re, and on the basis of these teachings restrain
an owner or a creditor in the exercise of his rights.
In the fourth place, the common law lawyer is not accus-
tomed to the building of a general theory like the one on
"abus de droit" starting from isolated articles in the Civil
Code, in the Code of Procedure or in administrative regula-
tions. The civilian is accustomed to think of those articles as
specific expressions of an overriding, all-pervasive, implicit
principle which runs through the various fields of the law.
Thus, every particular article will be placed in its systematic
place, and will be considered, evaluated and interpreted in
the light of the meaning of the system as a coherent whole.
The civilian mind is a systematic mind, while the common law
lawyer's mind is mainly analytical.
Finally, reference should be made to the fact that many
of the social and economic problems, which led the French
jurists and courts to elaborate the doctrine of abuse of rights
in order to render justice to the parties involved in the dis-
pute, were not so pressing in the common law area, either
because some remedies had already been provided or because
the same subject matter was dealt with under different legal
categories. Gutteridge mentioned in this context that the
theory of abuse of rights cuts across the line of many funda-
mental principles of the English law of torts such as the rules
relating to nuisance, to malicious prosecution and to the
rights of fair comment. 14
14. Id.
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However, the fact that several reasons can be invoked to
explain why the common law jurisdictions were not very
familiar with the doctrine of the abuse of rights and, there-
fore, unwilling or unable to consider its application, does not
provide sufficient justification for their general lack of in-
terest in its study.
Abuse of rights, as a modern legal institution of the civil
law, cannot and should not be ignored. It colors the provisions
of the civilian codes and statutes; it has been formally incor-
porated into modern Civil Codes (i.e., Germany, Switzerland,
U.S.S.R., Turkey, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, Argenti-
na); and in those countries where it has not been formally
acknowledged, jurists and judges have construed traditional
rules concerning extra-contractual responsibility, limitations
of ownership rights, and good faith in the performance of
contractual obligations, in such a manner that the doctrine of
abuse of rights is said to be one of the underlying principles of
the national law.
Continuous expansion of international travel and trade,
growing interdependence of nations, and better understand-
ing of national and foreign legal institutions, makes it very
convenient and timely for the common law lawyer to study
the doctrine of abuse of rights.
III. PRESENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE
A brief and sufficiently clear exposition of the doctrine of
abuse of rights is very difficult to make. The doctrine is
rather recent, at least in its modern meaning, and there are
broad divergences among civilians and civil law courts con-
cerning its proper scope and limits. There is still a great deal
of discussion as to what are really the grounds covered by the
doctrine. At its present stage of development, it is difficult to
state neat, clear and precise concepts embodying the doc-
trine.15
15. Said Demogue at 4 TRAITr DES OBLIGATIONS EN GPNgRAL 363 (1924):
"There is uncertainty as to the autonomous concept of abuse of rights. Is it a
case of illicit act or is it a special case of use of right, some kind of a special
area of the Law?" In a similar vein, Capitant: "Doctrine has tried without
success, so far, to elaborate a theory on abuse of rights. The attempt is
premature; it is not possible, yet, to systematize the precedents established
by the Courts on this matter, nor to build on some of the pillars sunk by the
Courts into this new ground. Up to the present time, those judgments do not
provide a comprehensive view of the whole. Courts have applied the notion of
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
When the cases are studied in France, Germany, Switzer-
land and Argentina-to cite just a few countries where the
doctrine has been accepted and developed-it becomes obvi-
ous that judges approach the handling of claims with caution
as if they were aware of the risks involved in the application
of the doctrine. How far the courts will go remains to be seen.
To wait and see, seems to be good advice in this matter, at
least for the time being.
Accordingly, any attempt now to enunciate precise defini-
tions and elaborated theories, is bound to fail. Certainly, this
is not a happy state of affairs, particularly for the civilians.
They are very much concerned with the logical coherence of
the system as a whole. Each legal institution is supposed to
have its proper place within well-defined boundaries. The doc-
trine of abuse of rights, though, has disrupted traditional
classifications of legal materials, has created semantic prob-
lems and has introduced elements which were alien to the
prevailing positivistic approach-that the law is given by the
legislators to the judges for its application as enacted.
It is true that important legal thinkers have welcomed
the doctrine as an indispensable tool that is necessary in
order to do justice in particular cases and to avoid the in-
equities caused by the abstract nature of the propositions of
statutes;16 but it is equally true that certain limits, however
broad they may be, are needed in order to make possible an
orderly development of the doctrine of abuse of rights.
The task has been undertaken. Some of the best legal
minds in Europe and in Latin America have been working on
this subject. A brief list of some of the first-class jurists who
have written extensively on the subject should be sufficient
to indicate the importance of the doctrinal effort to better
define and specify the doctrine: In France-Capitant,"7 Jos-
abuse of rights only with reference to certain specified rights, and the condi-
tions which they require for its application, varies with the classes of rights
involved" (note published at D.P. 1926.3.10). Subsequently, see Gutteridge at
42: "It is beyond doubt that the theory of abuse has obtained a footing, in one
form or another, in most of the continental systems of law. It is also clear
that the continental judges can employ it for the purpose of defeating any
attempt to utilize a rule of law for a dishonest purpose. But in no case ... do
we find any real attempt to define the content of the theory, and it must still
be considered uncertain both as regards its basis and the degree to which it is
applicable to the exercise of legal rights." This judgment of Gutteridge is still
valid, forty years later, as will be seen below.
16. ARISTOTLE, 9 ETHICA NICHOMACHEA bk. 5, 1 1 3 7 d, 113 7 b, 1138
a .
17. H. CAPITANT, COURS PiL9IMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS (1924).
[Vol. 35
1975] ABUSE OF RIGHTS
serand,1 8  Larombi6re, 19 Ripert,20  Planiol,21  H. and L.
Mazeaud,22 Desserteaux, 23 Saleilles,24 Bonnecase,25 Mar-
kovitch, 26 Charmont; 27 in Italy-Rotondi, 28 Flumene,29 in
Germany-Enneccerus, Kipp, Wolff, Nipperdey, Lehmann, 30
von Tuhr,3 1 in Switzerland-Funk,32 Schneider, Fink;33 in
Spain-Martinez-Useros, 34  Calvo-Sotelo, 35  Colomer-
Marquez; 36 in Portugal-Da Cunha-Gongalves; 37 in Belgium-
Campion,3 8 de Page, 39 Laurent;40 in Argentina-Fleitas,4 1
18. L. JOSSERAND, DE L'ESPRIT DES DRO1TS ET DE LEUR RELATIVnTI:
TIORIE DITE DE L'ABUS DES DROITS (2d ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as JOS-
SERAND].
19. L. LAROMBItRE, THORIE ET PRATIQUE DES OBLIGATIONS (1885).
20. RIPERT, LE RtGIME DEMOCRATIQUE ET LE DROIT CIVIL MODERNE
(1936); Ripert, Abus ou RelativitU des Droits, 49 REV. CRIT. DE L19G. ET JUR. 33
(1929); Ripert, L'exercise des Droits et la Responsibilitg Civile, 35 REV. CRIT. DE
LG. ET JuR. 352 (1906).
21. M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959); M.
PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, TRATADO PRACTICO DE DERECHO CIVIL FRANCtS (1940).
22. H. ET L. MAZEAUD, TRAIT THORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPON-
SABILIT CIVILE DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE (2d ed. 1934).
23. Desserteaux,Abus des Droits ou Conflits de Droits, 5 REV. TRIM. DROIT
CIV. 119 (1906).
24. Saleilles, De l'Abus de Droit, 1905 BULL. SOC. 2TUDES LPG. 325-350.
25. J. BONNECASE, TRAITI THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL (1926).
26. MARKOVITCH, LA THORIE DE L'ABUS DES DROITS EN DROIT COMPARA,
41 Biblioth~que de r'Inst. de Droit Comp. (1936).
27. Charmont, L'Abus de Droit, 1 REV. TRIM. DROIT CIV. 113 (1902).
28. Rotondi, L'Abuso di Diritto, 15 REV. DIR. CIV. 105 (1923).
29. FLUMEME, L'USO ILLECITO DEL DIRITTO, STUDI IN ONORE DE F. AScOLI
(1936).
30. L. ENNECCERUS, T. KIPP AND M. WOLFF, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL,
PARTE GENERAL (rev. ed. Nipperdey 1947); L. ENNECCERUS, T. KIPP AND M.
WOLFF, DERECHO DE LAS OBLIGACIONES (rev. ed. Lehmann 1950-1955).
31. A. VON TUHR, TRATADO DE LAS OBLIGACIONES (1934).
32.. F.FuNK, COMMENTAIRE DU CODE FtDtRAL DES OBLIGATIONS (1930).
33. A. SCHNEIDER AND H. FICK, COMMENTAIRE DU CODE FtD]tRAL DES
OBLIGATIONS DU 30 MARS (1911).
34. E. MARTINEZ-USEROS, LA DOCTRINA DEL ABUSO DEL DERECHO Y EL
ORDEN JURfDICO ADMINISTRATIVO (1947).
35. CALVO-SOTELO, LA DOCTRINA DEL ABUSO DEL DERECHO COMO LIMITA-
CI6N DEL DERECHO SUBJETIVO (1917).
36. Colomer-Marquez, El Abuso de la Ley, REV. JUR. CATALUIRA (1951).
37. DA CUNHA-GONQALVES, TRATADO DE DIREITO CIVIL EM COMENTARIO
DO CODIGO CIVIL PORTUGUEZ (1929-1945).
38. L. CAMPION, DE L'EXERCICE ANTISOCIAL DES DROITS SUBJECTIFS: LA
TI-IORIE DE L'ABUS DES DROITS (1925).
39. H. DE PAGE, TRAIT, ALMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL BELGE (1933).
40. F. LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL (3d ed. 1878).
41. A. FLEITAS, EL ABUSO DEL DERECHO EN LA REFORMA DEL C6DIGO
CIVIL ARGENTINO (1944).
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Spota,42 Alsina-Atienza, 4 3 Borda, 44 Salvat;45 in Brazil-
Martins,46 Americano; 47 in Chile-Alessandri-Rodriguez ;48 in
Colombia-Ruiz-Lujan; 49 in Paraguay-De Gasperi; 50 in
Peru-Rodriquez-Llerena, 51 Garcia-Sayan; 52 in Uruguay-
Amezaga; 53 in Venezuela-Pulido-Villegas;54 in Mexico-
Borja-Soriano; 55 in the Arab countries-Fathy,56 Santillana.57
It seems convenient, under these circumstances, to make
a brief inventory of the doctrine, its achievements, its limita-
tions, its growth, looking at the countries where its reception
or its development has been significant.
IV. THE SEMANTIC QUESTION
The terms "abuse of rights" or "abusive use of rights"
are, to say the least, baffling expressions. They appear to be
contradictory, lacking any clear, definable meaning. Planiol
thought that they did not convey any rational meaning at all;
he has been very critical of their use by jurists and judges:
This new doctrine is based entirely on language in-
sufficiently studied; its formula "abusive use of rights" is
42. SPOTA, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL (1947).
43. H. ALSINA-ATIENZA, EFECTOS JURI1COS DE LA BUENA FE EN SUS
RELACIONES CON LAS MODERNAS TENDENCIAS JURIDICAS: LA APARIENCIA, LA
IMPREVISI6N, EL ABUSO DEL DERECHO (1935).
44. BORDA, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL ARGENTINO: PARTE GENERAL
(5th ed. 1970).
45. Salvat, Teoria del Abuso del Derecho, 6 REV. J.A. LA LEY, Sec. Doc-
trina 51 (1937).
46. P. MARTINS, 0 ABUSO DO DIREITO E o AcTO ILLICITO (2d ed. 1941).
47. J. AMERICANO, 0 ABUSO DO DIREITO NO EXERCICIO DA DEMANDA (2d ed.
1932).
48. A. ALESSANDRI-RODRIGUEZ, DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD EXTRACON-
TRACTUAL EN EL DERECHO CIVIL CHILENO (1943).
49. RUIZ-LUJAN, EL ABUSO DEL DERECHO Y LA LEGISLACI6N COLOMBIANA
(1940).
50. L. DE GASPERI, TRATADO DE LAS OBLIGACIONES EN EL DERECHO CIVIL
PARAGUAYO Y ARGENTINO (1946).
51. RODRIGUEZ-LLERENA, C6DIGO CIVIL (1937).
52. GARCIA-SAYAN, LAS NUEVAS TENDENCIAS EN EL DERECHO CON-
TRACTUAL Y LA LEGISLACIN PERUANA (1942).
53. AMItZAGA, CULPA AQUILIANA (1914).
54. A. PULIDO-VILLEGAS, CODIGO CIVIL DE VENEZUELA SEGUN TEXTO OFI-
CIAL, ANOTADO (1944).
55. BORJA-SORIANO, TEORIA GENERAL DE LAS OBLIGACIONES (1939).
56. FATHY, LA DOCTRINE MUSULMANE DE L'ABUS DES DROITS (1913).
57. SANTILLANA, ISTITUZIONE DE DIRITrO MUSULMANO MALICHITA CON
RIGUARDO ANCHE AL SISTEMA SCIAFIITA (1926-1928).
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a logomachy, for if I use my right, my act is licit; and
when it is illicit it is because I exceed my right and act
without right, injuria, as is said in the Aquilian law. To
deny the abusive use of rights is not to permit a great
variety of acts which the jurisprudence has prohibited. It
is merely to make the observation that every abusive act,
by the fact alone that it is illicit, is not the exercise of a
right, and the abuse does not constitute a distinct juridi-
cal category of illicit acts. One must not be misled by the
use of words: the right ceases where the abuse com-
mences, and there cannot be an "abusive use" of a right
of whatever sort, because of the irrefutable reason that
one and the same act cannot at the same time be in
conformity to law and contrary to law.58
However, Planiol hastens to make known that he is not
arguing for the acknowledgment of absolute rights. He thinks
that words should be used properly and that there is not such
a propriety in the new formula. As to the substance of the
problem he says: "Basically, everybody is in agreement, the
difference is that where some say that there is 'abusive use of
a right' the others say that 'An act has taken place without
right.' They defend a just idea with a false formula. 5 9 And
then he adds: "The only truth somewhat new (and is it really
that?) which comes out of these discussions is that there are
considerable and continual variations in the ideas formulated
regarding the extent of human rights. The right which was
formerly considered absolute has ceased to be that, others
subject to few restrictions have been subjected to many
others."60
There may be some grounds for the statement that the
doctrine has been poorly named. It may not be so grounded to
say that it is "based entirely 'on language insufficiently
studied." It is arguable to say, at least at the present stage of
development of the doctrine, that an "abusive act" is an "il-
licit act" if we take this expression in its traditional meaning
(malicious, negligent or tortious acts in violation of the law,
whereby damages are caused to third parties).
It seems that Planiol raises some questions which go
beyond the level of semantics. These will be considered later,
58. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, no. 871 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
59. Id. at 477-78.
60. Id. at 478.
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after the present discussion concerning the adequacy of the
words commonly used to name the doctrine.
One of the functions of words is to make reference, to
name, and to allude to specific objects. They may perform this
task with a satisfactory degree of clarity and precision, or
they may be too vague or too ambiguous.
Lawyers and judges needed an expression to refer to the
situation which arose by the middle of the XIX century when
the Courts of Colmar and Lyon decided that landbwners were
not allowed to exercise their property rights if doing so was
purposely to injure a neighbor. Perhaps they could have used
some traditional Roman expression such as "malitiis non in-
dulgendum" (malice is not to be excused) or "si modo non hoc
animo fecit, ut tibi noceat, sed ne sibi noceat" (if this was not
done with the intent of hurting the other, but to avoid being
hurt himself), but Latin expressions are not as popular as
they used to be, even among lawyers. Furthermore, they in-
vite retaliation by the simple method of using phrases of
opposite meaning ("qui jure suo utitur neminen laedit"-he
who exercises his rights cannot harm another; "non videtur
vim facere qui sue jure utitur et ordinaria actione
expeitur"-he who exercises his right and ordinary action,
cannot do violence).
"Abuse of rights" or "abusive use of rights" may look like
self-contradictory expressions, if we consider them from a
purely logical standpoint. But, on the other hand, they have
performed well their referential function. Every time the
reader sees them, he knows to what kind of modern legal
phenomenon they refer, to wit, acts which objectively appear
as exercise of individual rights (an owner building on or drill-
ing in his own land), but which were not protected by the
courts because they had been motivated by the desire to
harm a neighbor, or because they were contrary to good faith,
or were performed without any legitimate interest what-
soever and so forth.
Perhaps better words could be found. Other expressions
have been suggested such as "abuse of statutes" and
"conflicts of rights," but these have not made any headway
with the specialized public of the law: judges, lawyers and
jurists. The traditional expressions, "abuse of rights" and
"abusive use of rights" have circulated, have gained wide
recognition and acceptance. The name is no longer ambiguous
or vague. Ambiguity and vagueness, if any, should lay to rest
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where they belong: in the legal phenomenon itself. In other
words, the question to be faced is not merely a terminological
one. The important thing now is to define the subject matter
or the object to which the expressions "abuse of rights" or
"abusive use of rights" refer.
Planiol's criticism and the need to clarify the subject
matter of our concern makes it convenient to discuss here the
differences, if any, between "illicit" acts, "excessive" acts,
and "abusive" acts. These three expressions appear to refer
to three different classes of legal situations.
(a) Illicit Acts
In the civil law it is generally understood that an act is
illicit when it is an act which violates a rule of law, usually
performed by a person with the intent to harm, or aware of
the harm his act could bring about, or without due care. In
the situations where a person fires a gun and kills another, or
when he hits a minor because of careless driving, or because
he manufactures or markets goods or merchandise negli-
gently made and capable of injuring another, lawyers are not
accustomed to speak of abusive acts, or of abuse of rights, or
of an abusive use of rights. In civil law jurisdictions it is
customary in these cases to speak of illicit acts.
(b) Excessive Acts
The use and enjoyment of land, goods or other legally
protected interests by their owners or holders may be af-
fected by the use other persons make of similar goods. Thus, if
a person sets up a factory in an area reserved for industrial
buildings, holding the appropriate permit or authorization
issued by the competent administrative authorities, and op-
erates this factory in such a manner that unavoidable bad
odors, thermal pollution or earth vibrations, affect the en-
joyment of nearby properties and diminish their value, then
those owners or holders may be obliged to redress the injured
parties. The building and the operation of the factory were
carried out in accordance with standing administrative regu-
lations for a valuable social objective (manufacturing of goods
for human use or consumption) but the use of the land was
not "normal" or "regular" but "excessive." It was used to
support machinery and equipment which caused acute dis-
comfort to neighbors by their emissions, odors, heat waves
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and vibrations. The law usually will not forbid the operation
of plants which by inherent and unavoidable technical
reasons can cause losses to third parties, but will impose on
the operators of the plants, or owners of the land, the duty to
indemnify the injured neighbors.
(c) Abusive Acts
There is a third category of acts which entail liability.
Those are acts performed by persons whom the legal order
entitles to use land, goods and other physical objects, as they
deem fit, or to request performance of duties and obligations
which other parties owe them. Such persons may seek the
assistance of the state through the judiciary in order to en-
force compliance or to appeal, petition or claim before the
organs of the state for the protection, recognition or declara-
tion of their rights, their privileges, their powers or their
immunities.6 1
Rules of law, either statutory or customary, or jurispru-
dential (case law) as applied to facts or relations, confer upon
a person certain rights, powers, privileges or immunities
which are legally protected by the organs of the state. Nor-
mally a person will exercise broad discretion in the enjoy-
ment of those rights, powers, privileges and immunities with-
out any restrictions or interference whatsoever. The
judiciary will be ready to enforce them or to protect them.
They are licit acts. However, the holder of rights or powers
may be interested in their exercise just for the sheer and
exclusive purpose of harming another. Externally, it appears
that the holder of rights is doing exactly what he is entitled
to do. In fact, he is using his rights for a harmful purpose.
In the Quebec case of Brodeur v. Choinier,6 2 plaintiff
owned and occupied a small lot, bounded on one side and in
the back by defendant's farm. Defendant's buildings were at
a distance of about 180 French feet from the separation line
between the two properties; plaintiffs residence was situated
at a few feet from the boundary. Defendant kept hens and
turkeys in his yard; plaintiff complained about incursions of
61. These terms are used in the sense given by HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 36-64 (1923). In this article the expressions "right" or
"rights" will refer to, usually and indistinctly, to powers, privileges, and im-
munities.
62. [1945] S.C. 334 (Quebec).
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defendant's poultry on his property. Relations between the
neighbors became very tense. One day one of defendant's
children, together with other youngsters, entered into plain-
tiffs lot of land. Plaintiff lodged a complaint with the local
court and a writ was served upon them ordering their ap-
pearance before the judge. During the week preceding their
appearance, the defendant, together with his son and most of
the accused youngsters, erected alongside plaintiffs house,
on or near the separation line, a fence 47 feet long and 18 1/2
feet high, the demolition of which was requested by the plain-
tiff. The fence was made of rough wood and had a ghastly
appearance. It was built with the sole purpose of depriving
plaintiff of air, sun and light, and lessening the value of his
property. When the work was completed, a flag was hoisted at
the top. Defendant argued that the fence had been built in
order to keep his hens in his own property and thus avoid
causing damage to his neighbor. The court found that this
was not the truth. It came to the conclusion that defendant
had made these works maliciously without any usefulness for
himself, and with the sole purpose to harm the plaintiff and
to gratify his aversion to him. The French-Canadian Court
said:
The Tribunal cannot encourage or sanction prejudicial
acts of this kind. Undoubtedly it is a matter of principle
and doctrine that the owner may do with his property
whatever he likes, if he is not subject to a servitude in
favor of a neighbouring property; he can modify it, de-
grade it, damage it; his freedom to erect upon it whatever
he deems appropriate is absolute; he is limited only by
the abuse of his owner's right exercised with the mali-
cious intent of being prejudicial to others without useful-
ness for himself or without serious motive ... considering
that the erection of the fence or palisade in question has
been made by the defendant without any usefulness for
him, maliciously, with the sole purpose of gratifying his
hatred and his feelings of revenge against the plaintiff,
demolition ordered, damages $30.
A similar case had been decided about half a century
before by the Court of Sedan, France.6 3 An owner had built a
fence 15.80 meters long and 10.15 meters high alongside the
63. Sedan, Dec. 17, 1901.
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separation line between his property and that of a neighbor.
That very high fence had been painted black. It shaded the
neighbor's house and diminished its market value. The Court
of Sedan did not admit the justification argued by the builder
of the fence that he had merely exercised his rights as an
owner, entitled to build on his premises as he wished.
A more striking case was decided by the Court of Dolores,
Argentina.6 4 An owner had built a very beautiful chimney on
a house located in a resort area, in such shape and manner
that it matched the architectural features of the houses of
both owners, as well as the main characteristics of the resi-
dences of the neighborhood. Unfortunately the architect had
committed a slight error: the chimney occupied between 5
and 11 centimeters of the air space above the neighbor's lot.
The neighbor then brought suit against the owner of the
chimney, requesting its demolition since it had invaded his
property. The Court refused to enforce the property rights
invoked by the claimant; it said that there was no question
that the owner was entitled to enjoy the ownership of his lot
of land without excesses or infringements by other persons,
but that in the instant case, no interest whatsoever appeared
to justify the claim filed by the owner. There was no economic
interest, no esthetic interest, and no moral interest involved,
and therefore there lay no action for the owner which could
be admitted by the court.65
64. 50 REV. J.A., LA LEY, Sec. Doctrina 1 (1950).
65. For a very interesting Dutch case, which offers certain similarities
with the Argentine one, see Scholtens at 47. "In the eighteenth century the
doctrine of abuse of rights came up for consideration in a case reported by
Van Bynkershoek in his OBSERVATIONES TUMULTUARIAE. A local enactment
of the City of Amsterdam forbad a co-owner to increase the height of or to
build against a common wall between two properties without the consent of
his neighbor if the wall was overhanging out of the vertical line. In the
present case a co-owner of a common wall had raised the height of this wall
and had proceeded to build against it in contravention of the above enact-
ment. The other co-owner applied for an order of court for the demolition of
the new structures .... It was common cause between the parties that the
wall was overhanging at a height of forty-one feet to the extent of one and a
half to two inches only.... Bynkershoek in his report of the case first pointed
out that the enactment indistinctly spoke of overhanging walls and did not
contain any provision as to the degree to which a wall should be overhanging.
It might perhaps be said that in these circumstances some neighbors did not
object to new structures as the witnesses for the defendant had stated, but
Van Bynkershoek raised the tentative question: If a person should want to
avail himself of his right, why should he not be entitled to do so? Bynker-
shoek accepted as the undoubted ratio statuti that nothing detrimental
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The best-known French case, and the one which gave a
great impulse to the doctrine of abuse of rights, was the
famous affair Clement-Bayard, decided by the Tribunal of
Compi~gne, confirmed by the Court of Amiens66 and finally by
the Court of Cassation.67 A gentleman by the name of
Coquerel had bought a lot of land, 170 meters long and 10 to
12 meters wide, just in front of the tract of land where
C16ment-Bayard had built a hangar for dirigibles. There was
a distance of about 90 m. between the lot of Coquerel and the
hangar of C16ment-Bayard. Coquerel had tried to sell.his land
at a nice profit to Clment-Bayard, but the latter was unwill-
ing to pay the price requested. Whereupon Coquerel built
two wooden fences, 15 meters long, 10 to 11 meters high, and
on top of the fences Coquerel installed four steel spikes, 2 to 3
meters high each. These spikes were clearly dangerous to
C16ment-Bayard's dirigibles, especially when strong winds
made difficult the maneuvering of the airships. Actually, one
of the dirigibles had been pierced by one of Coquerel's spikes.
C16ment-Bayard brought suit against Coquerel, asking that
defendant be directed to eliminate the spikes and the high
fences and to pay damages. Coquerel answered the complaint,
alleging that he was seeking an economic advantage to which
he as an owner, was entitled (i.e., obtaining as much profit as
possible from the sale of his lot of land). In other words, he
was not trying to hurt C16ment-Bayard just for the sheer
sake of hurting him, but with the aim of obtaining a specula-
tive benefit. The three tribunals involved in the case coin-
cided in their judgment: Coquerel's action was abusive. He
was ordered to dismantle the spikes and fences, and to pay
damages.
The four cases referred to above may help to see the
difference between an illicit act (in the traditional sense of
should be done to a neighbor. He added that perhaps 'malicious tricks on the
part of the plaintiff need not be sanctioned if it were clearly proven by the
defendant that an overhanging of that character could obviously cause no
harm to the plaintiff. In the present case the defendant had not only failed to
do so but when starting with the work both the defendant and her late
husband had intimated to the plaintiff that in view of the condition of the
wall it would not be permissible to raise its height without the consent of the
plaintiff." The local Court of Amsterdam had decided the case for the defen-
dant. The Hof van Holland reversed and decided for plaintiff. On defendant's
appeal, the Hoge Raad, confirmed for plaintiff.
66. Amiens, February 7, 1912, D.P.III.1913.2.177.
67. Req., August 3, 1915, D.P.III.1917.1.79.
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the word) and an abusive act, and between an excessive
act 68 and an abusive act.
(d) Comments
Perhaps these distinctions require some additional de-
velopment in order to avoid logical confusion and fruitless
discussions which are often due to lack of understanding as to
the meaning of the words employed by the judges, the legis-
lators, and the jurists.
The first comment refers to the class of illicit acts and to
Planiol's criticism. It is perfectly logical to say that all human
acts are either licit or illicit; "tertium non datur.' ' 69 Therefore
the so-called abusive acts are either licit or illicit. Since the
doctrine of abuse of rights holds that an abusive act may be
the source of an obligation to indemnify the hurt party, or of
a duty to eliminate, destroy or modify what was built or done
to the detriment of the other party, the logical conclusion is
that an abusive act is an illicit act. This was the position
taken by Planiol. However, beyond the semantic problem re-
lative to the meaning of the word "illicit," there is a real and
very meaningful difference between the acts of human be-
havior which we have traditionally called "illicit acts"
(malicious, or negligent or tortious, illegal and to the detri-
ment of another) and the "new" illicit acts, the "abusive"
acts, the acts whereby rights are used with the intent to
harm another, or without any serious and legitimate interest.
In the latter case, there is no question that the holder of the
68. Article 669 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides a good instance of
excessive acts: "If the works or materials for any manufactory or other
operation, cause an inconvenience to those in the same or in the neighboring
houses, by diffusing smoke or nauseous smell, and there be no servitude
established by which they are regulated, their sufferance must be determined
by the rules of the police, or the customs of the place."
Another instance may be found at BGB art. 907: "The owner of a piece of
land may prevent the construction or erecting, on an adjoining piece of land, of
structures from which it can be foreseen with certainty that their condition or
use will result in an inadmissible interference with his land. If a structure
complies with the provisions of the State law which prescribe a specified dis-
tance from the boundary or other protective measures, the removal of the
structure can be required only if the inadmissible interference actually takes
place." (Wang transl. 1907).
69. This classification is not very useful in law because itis too general. It is
utterly insufficient to grasp all of the important nuances, shades, and differ-
ences which characterize the juridical meaning of human behavior.
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right is enjoying and using a veritable right conferred upon
him by the legal order. That right, however, is being used
with such purpose or in such circumstances that the law will
not protect this exercise.
If, in order to keep logical consistency and coherence of
language, the same word "illicit" were to be used for both of
the two different types of acts just mentioned, then a distinc-
tion should be kept clearly in mind: these two types of illicit
acts have a common feature-they entail legal liabilities-but
they differ in their legal meaning.
The traditional illicit act, call it for the sake of clarity
"illicit alpha," is an act done without right, in violation of the
objective law. The "illicit" act known as abuse of rights, call it
for the sake of clarity "illicit beta," is an act performed by a
person who was empowered by objective law to perform it,
but which is not protected or enforced by the law on account
of the purpose or circumstances in which it was exercised:
with the intent to harm; without any serious and legitimate
interest; against good faith, good customs or positive morali-
ty; for an aim or end contrary to the aim or end on account of
which that right was conferred or vested.
Hereinafter we will call "illicit acts" the ones referred to
above as "illicit alpha," and will call "abusive acts," "abuse of
rights," or "abusive use of rights," the ones referred above as
"illicit beta."
The second comment refers to the distinction between
excessive acts and abusive acts. Perhaps the best way to
approach the subject is to think of the cases where limita-
tions or charges are imposed by the law on the holders of
certain rights who, while exercising them in accordance with
their valuable social aims, may at the same time injure or
restrict the rights of another person. If a railroad purchases
tracts of land in order to lay rails and operate trains thereon,
and while doing this-to its own benefit and for the benefit of
the social group as a whole-it caused trepidations, noise and
emissions which harm the neighbors and diminish the value
of their properties, the railroad company may be obliged to
indemnify the damaged parties. Usually, we would not call
"illicit" the acts performed by the railroad company. It had
been legally authorized to operate a railroad by the compe-
tent authorities of the state, and the noise, emissions and
trepidations were the unavoidable technical consequences of
the operation of the equipment and machinery required to
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run a railroad. However, since the railroad company was to
be benefited by the operation of the trains, it was only just
and equitable that it should compensate those neighbors who
had been injured thereby. Certain judges and jurists have
called these acts, "abusive acts." In effect, an excess, some-
thing which is not normal, nor regular, may be called "abu-
sive." But in this case, it will be very convenient to distin-
guish clearly between both types of "abusive acts." The "abu-
sive acts alpha," where the harm is unavoidably caused by a
certain manner of exercise of the right, which is in accor-
dance with its social function (exercise which is often ap-
proved or even promoted by organs of the State), and the
"abusive acts beta," where the right is exercised with the
intent to harm another, or without any serious and legitimate
interest.
Hereinafter we will call "excessive acts" those referred to
above as "abusive acts alpha," and "abusive acts" or "abuse
of rights" or "abusive use of rights" those acts referred to
above as "abusive acts beta."
V. THE CRITERION OF DISTINCTION
It is a well-known fact of social life that the holder of a
right may, more often than not, bring about some negative
consequences to other persons, by the mere exercise of his
rights. One of the most important functions of the law is to
provide an orderly procedure for the distribution of benefits
and charges, for the settlement of disputes, the award of
recompenses, the recognition of privileges, the enforcement of
immunities. In this process, some of the parties involved are
bound to suffer injuries to their interests by the mere exer-
cise of the rights belonging to one of the other parties. If the
seller sues to collect the agreed price and the buyer is con-
vinced now that he agreed to pay too high a price, and so it is,
then enforcement of the contract in order to collect the price
owed to the seller will harm the buyer. If a corporation un-
dertakes a successful promotional campaign and takes away
customers and clients from other competing corporations,
these will be damaged thereby.
It is not necessary to discuss this matter further in order
to show that the mere exercise of rights may and does cause
losses, damages or harm to other parties. However, damages
by themselves will not make abusive the use of rights. If it
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were otherwise, social and economic traffic could not be car-
ried on.
Therefore, the question arises as to what is the distinc-
tive feature which makes the use of a right an abusive act, an
abuse of right. Obviously, this is a crucial matter. Therein lies
the all important question of determining the criterion, the
identifying concept whereby judges and jurists will be able to
determine whether an abuse of right has taken place or not.
If we look at French case law (jurisprudence), where the
idea of abuse of rights has been explored with greater imagi-
nation and consistency by judges, we will find that a variety
of criteria have been selected and applied, sometimes expand-
ing, others restricting, the scope of the theory of abuse of
rights.
(a) Exercise of a Right With the Intent to Harm
In the first two French cases which put in motion the
modern doctrine of abusive use of rights (the Doerr and
Sources de Saint Galmier cases discussed in text at footnotes
1 and 4), the courts refused to enforce the rights of the own-
ers of the lots (where the fence had been built, and where the
well had been drilled and the mineral water pumped) because
they came to the conclusion that the owners did not have
any other intent while exercising their rights than that of
harming their neighbors.
The exercise of a right, with the intent of harming
another, effectively causing damages thereby, will oblige the
holder of the rights so exercised, to redress the injured party.
This is an old civil law doctrine known under the name of
aemulatio. There has been a great deal of discussion among
Romanists as to whether there was a general principle under
Roman law, making illicit the act performed "animus
aemulandi," that is to say, the exercise of rights with the
intent of harming another. Scialoja was of the opinion that
there was not such a general prohibition,70 although he ad-
mitted that the harmful exercise of rights was prohibited in
certain specific areas of the law (e.g., use of rain water and
underground water). Pacchioni thought otherwise, particu-
larly on the strength of several texts and "constitutiones" of
70. Scialoja, verbo "aemulatio," 1 ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA ITALIANA pt. 2
§ 1 (1912).
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late Roman law.7 1 In any event, it appears that Roman law
would not accept the exercise of certain specific rights if it
was motivated by 'the sole intent of damaging another per-
son.
72
The opinions of Marcellus and Paulus, critical of the exer-
cise of rights with an intent to harm were received in the
Middle Ages. In Spain, the Partidas incorporated the princi-
ple stated by Marcellus. 73 In France and Italy, acts animo
71. 4 PACCHIONi, DIRiTTo CIVILE ITALIANO pt. 2 n. 5, quoted in 1 SPOTA,
TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL pt. 2, 133 (1947) [hereinafter cited as SPOTA].
72. The texts usually quoted are DIGEST 39.3.1.12 and DIGEST 39.3.2.9. The
first, due to Marcellus, reads as follows: "Marcellus escribit, cum eo, qui in suo
fodiens vicinifontem avertit, nihil posse agi, nee de dolo actionem; et sane non
debet habere, si non animo vicino nocendi, sed suum agrum melioremfaciendi id
fecit" (Then Marcellus writes that no action can be brought against one who by
digging on his own land intercepts another's spring, not even the actio doli; and
certainly he ought not to have it, if he did it, not with the intention of hurting his
neighbor but of making his own land better). The second, due to Paulus, reads:
"Idem Labeo ait, si vicinusflumen, torrent averterit, ne aqua ad eum perveniat,
et hoc modo si effectum, ut vicino noceatur, agi cum eo aquae pluviae arcendae
non posse; aqua enim arcere hoc esse curare non influat; qua sententiaverior est,
si modo non hoc animo facit, ut tibi noceat, sed ne sibi noceat" (Says the same
Labeon that if the neighbor had deviated a stream or a torrent so the water will
not come to him, and this had been done in such a way that it hurt the neighbor,
the actio aquae pluviae arcendae cannot be brought against him; because to
stop rain water is to care that it will not come in; whose opinion is more truthful
if this was not done with the intent of hurting him, but to avoid himself being
hurt).
73. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. 3a, tit. 32, L. 19: "Fuente o pozo de agua
auiendo algun ome en su casa si algun su vezino quisiesse fazer otro en la
suya, para auer agua o para aprouecharse del, puedelo fazer, e non puede el
otro deuedar; como quier que menguasse porende el agua de lafuente, o del su
pozo. Fueras ende, si este que to quisiesse fazer, non lo ouiesse menester; mas
se mouiesse maliciosamente por fazer mal, o engafto at otro, con la intencion
de destajar o de menguar las venas, por don viene el agua a su pozo o a su
fuente. Ca entonces bien lo podria vedar que non lo fisiesse; e si to ouiesse
fecho, podriangelo fazer derribar, o cerrar. Ca dizeren los Sabios, que a las
maldades de los omes non las deuen las Leyes, nin los Reyes sofrir, nin dar
passada; ante deuen siempre yr contra ellas" (Where a man has a spring or a
well on his premises and a neighbor desires to dig another on his own to
obtain water and make use of it, he can do so and the other party cannot
prevent him although on this account the water of his spring or well may be
diminished in quantity except when the party who desires to do this has no
need of it but was impelled by malice to injure or defraud the other party
with the intention of cutting off or diminishing the amount of water in the
veins by which his well or spring was supplied. Under these circumstances he
can forbid him to do this and where he has already done it he can be com-
pelled to destroy or close up the openings which he has made, for wise men have
stated that neither the Laws nor Kings should suffer or overlook the wicked-
ness of man but should, on the other hand, always oppose it) (Scott transl. 1931).
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nocendi (acts executed with the intent to injure another's
interests) were illicit. The Roman doctrine on aemulatio had
been developed by early French 74 and Italian75 glossators.
Scholtens recalls in his article an interesting medieval
opinion given by Alexander Tartagnus in a dispute between
the brothers De Lancis and the brothers De Schinellis. The
parties were owners of adjoining properties. The issue was
whether the De Lancis were entitled to erect a wall on their
property next to the common wall separating the two proper-
ties, if the new wall would impede the access of light to the
house of the De Schinellis. Tartagnus was of the opinion that
the court should appoint experts who should state their opin-
ion as to whether it was necessary or useful for the De Lancis
to erect said wall, or whether the building of the wall would
merely serve to harm the De Schinellis, and if the experts
were to find that the dominant reason for erecting of the
building was the intent to injure the De Schinellis, then the
court should not permit the erection of the wall.76
Similar principles were accepted in France during the
Renaissance; in Northern France, where customary law pre-
vailed, and in Southern France, where Roman law pre-
vailed.77 The same can be said of Germany,7 the Netherlands, 79
Switzerland, s" and Italy. sl
74. PETRUS DE BELLAPERTICA, COMMENTARIES ON THE INSTITUTES 1.7,
said: "Take notice of my saying that everybody can do on his own property
what is advantageous to himself, although it might injure another, provided
that he does not do it with the intention to injure the other. But if somebody
does something on his own property that is of slight advantage to him and
which greatly injures another it is presumed to be done ad aemulationem"
[translation in Scholtens at 41, from text transcribed by 2 E. MEIJERS, VER-
ZAMELDE PRIVAATRECHTELIJKE OPSTALLEN 178, 189 (1954) ]. Johannes Faber
said that the intention may make unlawful what otherwise, by itself, would
be lawful. J. FABER, SUPER CODICE 3.32: Et enim animus facit illicitum quod
alias de se esset licitum. See Scholtens at 42.
75. Bartolus was of the opinion that lawful acts were not permissible if
they were mainly done in order to injure another. Therefore, it was not
allowed to build a monastery or church, even within the territory as ap-
proved by the Pope, if the main purpose was to harm another monastery or
church. BARTOLUS, SUPER AUTHENTICIS, COLLATIO VI, tit. De operis novi
nuntiatone, and DIGEST 43.12.2 n.2 (see Scholtens at 41).
76. Scholtens at 42.
77. See BENOIT, DE LA CONDITION JURIDIQUE DES EAUX DE SOURCES
NON MIN9RALES D'APRPS LA LOI DU 8 AvRIL 1898 (1901). Benoit quoted opin-
ions by Henrys, Bretonnier and Bourjon, to the effect that the owner of
underground water was entitled to drill and to build on his property as he
pleased, provided his works were not motivated by his intent to harm his
neighbor. Id. at 13-16. Domat, speaking of ownership rights, was of the opin-
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We may say, then, that when the Courts of Lyon and
Colmar decided the Saint Galmier and Doerr cases-the Code
Napoleon already being in force-they had a long tradition to
support them, going back to the Justinian Code and even
further to some of the great classical Roman jurists. That
tradition told that the law should not tolerate acts performed
ad aemulationem alterius. In other words, the Courts of Col-
mar and Lyon were not inventing a new doctrine; theywere
not creating an entirely novel legal institution. They were
reviving an old one about limitations which should be im-
posed on the exercise of rights with the intent to harm other
parties.
Actually, the main problem here was one of evidence. If
the party seeking redress against an owner or a creditor who
abused his rights, had to produce proof of the intent to harm
as being the dominant motive for the exercise of the right in
question, serious and almost unsurmountable difficulties
could appear. The proof of "intent" or "motive" is tricky. It
has to be inferred from some external acts, and these may be
ambiguous or equivocal in many cases.
In the history of the Roman, medieval and Renaissance
antecedents of acts performed ad aemulationem alterius, it is
common to find a blend of the so-called "subjective" test and
"objective" test. An exercise of rights is abusive and should
not be protected by the law, if it is executed with the intent to
harm (subjective test), but this intent is to be inferred if the
one who exercises his right derived no benefit from such
exercise while, at the same time, he was injuring another
party 2 (objective test).
The question becomes more complicated when the intent
to injure another is mixed with other motives, such as
ion that an owner was liable if he had introduced modifications in his prop-
erty with the intent to harm another and without any benefit for himself. J.
DOMAT, LOIS CIVILES bk. 2, tit. 8, § 3, no. 9.
78. See 1 L. ENNECCERUS, T. KIPP AND M. WOLFF, TRATADO DE DERECHO
CIVIL: PARTE GENERAL pt. 2, 545 (1950).
79. See Scholtens at 45-48, especially his quotations of Zoesius, Perezius
and Christinaeus for southern Netherlands, and Hubert, Voet, Schrassert
and Schorer for northern Netherlands.
80. Scialoja, verbo "aemulatio," 1 ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA ITALIANA pt.
2 § 1 (1912).
81. See 1 SPOTA, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL pt. 2, 500-30 (1947).
82. MENOCHIUS, DE PRAESUMPTIONIBUS, bk. 6, praes. XXIX; MASCAR-
DUs, DE PROBATIONIBUS, DEC. 621, cited in Scholtens at 43; 3 J. BONNECASE,
TRAITt THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 377 (1902), and 2 PRECIS DE
DROIT CIVIL 313 (1934-1935); JOSSERAND at 366-78.
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speculative profits, or an excessive zeal concerning the exer-
cise of certain powers (e.g., in family law cases).
In the famous affair Clement-Bayard (see text at foot-
notes 66-67). Monsieur Coquerel wanted to hurt Clement-
Bayard. There was no question about that. He added, though,
that hurting Cl6ment-Bayard was not an end by itself, but
merely a means whereby Clement-Bayard would accept the
price asked by Coquerel. In the same manner, Mr. Pickles
intended to harm the inhabitants of Bradford, not for the
sake of hurting them, but merely as a technique whereby he
could force the Mayor and the Aldermen of Bradford to buy
him out at a higher price than they were willing to pay.
In a rather similar Court of Cassation case, plaintiff had
brought suit against defendant and sought attachment of
defendant's ship the day before due date of sailing, with the
intent of forcing the debtor to settle in terms which the cred-
itor deemed. satisfactory. The court held that there was an
abusive exercise of rights and rejected the complaint filed by
the creditor.8 3
A very interesting case of mixed motivation was decided by
the Court of Cassation at the beginning of this century. The
owner of a tract of land started hydraulic works with the intent
of draining his land. These works also drained neighboring
sources of water, to the detriment of plaintiff. Defendant al-
leged that he had a serious and valuable purpose in mind, to wit,
the drainage of his land. Expert testimony rendered at the trial
disclosed that the hydraulic work started by defendant was
useless. Decision was rendered for plaintiff but the award of
damages was limited to those damages which were caused by
the works after the date on which the testimony of the experts
became known to the defendant.84
In a divorce case, the judge imposed upon the husband
the duty of supporting a son of the marriage in a certain educa-
tional institution until his son would become of age or be
married. The husband decided to emancipate his son, who
thereby became competent with legal capacity to enter into
legal transactions on his own. The Court of Cassation held
that the emancipation, although a valid one, was abusive;
therefore, it ordered the husband to continue paying the bills
of the educational institution until the son became of age or
got married. 85
83. Req., February 19, 1879, D.P.III.1879.1.445.
84. Req., June 10, 1902, D.P.III.1902.1.454 S.1903.1.11.
85. Paris, November 17, 1901, D.P.III.1902.1.238.
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In all of the cases just cited, the owner or creditor who
exercised his rights to the detriment of his debtor or of a
third party, could claim some legitimate motive: to get a
better price for his property; to obtain prompt and advan-
tageous payment of a debt; to diminish school expenses. The
owner, or the creditor, or the empowered party, was not act-
ing with the exclusive purpose or intent of harming the other
party; but he knew that there were going to be losses or
harm, and even the harm to be caused became the means to
achieve some lawful objective.
In most civil law jurisdictions where the doctrine of abuse
of rights has been accepted,8 6 the mere fact that there was a
mixture of motives or purposes will not be sufficient to justify
an act if its dominant feature was the intent to harm, or if the
loss was deliberately caused by the exercise of a right, or if
the malicious or harmful purpose pervaded the whole exer-
cise or use of the right. The following opinion by Josserand
seems to be an accurate statement of the prevailing view
among civilians in the question of mixed motivations:
* . . if we were to admit that a few good grains would
purify the weeds, we would be opening the doors to
human malice. In the great majority of cases, the holder
of the right could invoke an acceptable motive, a legiti-
mate interest-the high wall will provide shade to him, or
will protect him from the wind; and by an act of good will,
wouldn't he have provided work to some people in a
period of unemployment? His imagination will help him
save face; and the theory of abuse due to malevolence
(malveillance) will become a dead letter. Actually, when
many motives have determined an act, it would be rare if
all of them were to be placed on the same level; one of
them has been predominant, determinant. This is the one
to take into account, not the others, and if it is founded on
malice, ill will (malveillance), intent to harm, it makes the
author liable .... The intent to harm makes an act an
abusive act when it has been the principal element, the
determinant element, and it will be a matter for the judge
to find in the particular case whether the intent to harm
has played a central function.8 7
86. This has occurred in a majority of Western Civil Law jurisdictions at
the present time.
87. JOSSERAND at 377. Crabb at 13 presents the same question in this
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Briefly summarized-if a person exercises his rights with
a predominant intent to harm, as evidenced by the fact that
he obtains little or no benefit from the exercise of his rights
while, at the same time, the other party or parties suffer
damages thereby, most courts in civil law jurisdictions will
find the act abusive, an abuse of rights. They will not enforce
it, or will award damages to the injured party, or will order
that what was built or done be demolished, modified or, if
possible, undone.8 8
way: "Intent to harm is specially prominent in abuse of certain classes of
rights, of which property rights would furnish the most notable examples.
The problem arises of whether abuse exists only when intent to harm is the
sole motive, or whether an admixture of legitimate motivation will defeat
liability. Probably there is no liability if a perverted satisfaction out of harm-
ing another merely adds zest to the enjoyment of an otherwise proper exer-
cise of a right. However, it seems only proper that the legitimate motive must
be predominant or at least substantial before its infusion will annul the lia-
bility for intent to harm; otherwise, the actor could lend sanctity to his out-
rageous behavior by setting up some kind of insubstantial but technically
correct purpose behind his behavior."
88. A few selected instances chosen from three civil law jurisdictions
(two European and one Latin-American) will help to understand the point
made in the text.
France: Paris, December 2, 1871, D.P.III.1873.2.185. (making deafening
noise by defendant on his land, with the purpose of frightening game and
making impossible hunting by neighboring plaintiff, held abusive); Trib. Civ.
Draguignan, May 17, 1910, D.P.1911.2.133 (mining of mine by defendant,
choosing, among many, the procedure which most damaged neighboring de-
fendant, held abusive); Req., May 5, 1897, S.1901.1.454 (disclosure to third
parties by defendant (addressee) of letters of a confidential nature, held abu-
sive); Req., December 26, 1893, D.P.1895.1.529 (multiplication of law suits
against relatives of defendant's wife during twelve years with no other pur-
pose than that of hindering and annoying said relatives, held abusive); Paris,
February 8, 1912, D.P.1912.2.273 (continuous traveling by father with his
child making impossible for his mother to see her child and to stay with him,
with purpose of forcing wife to demand divorce, held abusive and custody of
child awarded to mother); Req., May 8, 1876, D.P.1876.1.259 (editor of news-
paper invited readers to boycott business of a merchant; no slander, or
calumny, was printed nor any violation of law nor any misdemeanor was
found to have occurred; main reason for the invitation found to be the intent
to harm the business of merchant; editor held liable to pay damages); Req.,
June 29, 1897, D.P.1897.1.537 (employer was struck by union, shortly thereaf-
ter third parties (mostly local politicians) intervened in the dispute by or-
ganizing a public campaign of support for the union and of attacks against
the employer, damaging employer thereby; third parties held liable and ob-
liged to pay damages to employer).
Germany: 57 R.G.E. 239 (willful impairment of economic value of houses
by establishment of a brothel in their neighborhood, contrary to good faith,
and defendant liable to pay damages); 58 R.G.E. 219 (deliberate performance
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(b) Exercise of a Right Without any Legitimate and, Serious
Interest
'In many civil law jurisdictions, the courts 1have'gone a
step further in the policing of the exercise of rights, pariticu-
larly when the owner or creditor seeks their assistance for
the judicial enforcement of those rights. They have denied
such enforcement or have awarded damages to the injured
party, although intent to harm was not proved (or even al-
leged), in cases where it was shown that there was no serious
and legitimate interest on the part of the owner, creditor or
holder of the right, worthy of judicial protection.
of acts of an economic nature in order to ruin a competitor and to buy his
assets cheaply, contrary to good faith, and defendant liable to pay damages);
1916 R.G. Warn #277, 1918 R.G. Warn #218 (banker's inducement of
inexpert persons to enter into risky stock exchange transactions, contrary to
good faith and entailing liability); 95 R.G.E. 313 (deliberate lengthening of a
judicial suit to the detriment of the other party by the introduction of- de-
fenses which were known to be groundless, contrary to good faith and entail-
ing liability); 1918 II R.G. Rech. #971 (acceptance of an offer by offeree
knowing that offeror had committed an error in calculation at the time of
making the offer, contrary to good faith); 53 R.G.E. 171 (filing of a petition for
registration of the name of a periodical, without any serious intent of ever
publishing it, in order to prevent the use of same name by another publisher,
contrary to good faith and entailing liability); 1912 R.G. Warn #386 (en-
dorsement of a bill of exchange with the exclusive purpose of making unavail-
able certain defenses of debtor, held contrary to good faith, entailing liability).
Argentina: 34 REV. LA LEY 175 (the owners of two rural properties en-
tered into an agreement whereby one of them was to indicate, under certain
circumstances, the place through which the adjoining owner could pass with
his trucks and cars. Once the condition was fulfilled, the owner, of the ser-
vient property selected a narrow, winding, perilous strip of land, subject to
periodic floods, as the place through which the owner of the adjoining tract of
land would be allowed to pass; the agreement clearly empowered the owner
of the servient land to select the place through which the adjoining owner
could pass. But by selecting an inundable, narrow, perilous strip of land, the
owner of the servient land was harming the owner of the dominant land by
putting in jeopardy his personal security, by frustrating his efforts to move
his production out of his farm and by making impossible enjoyment of said
farm by schoolboys during vacation time; held that owner of servient land
had abused his rights and was bound to pay damages to owner of dominant
land); 37 REV. LA LEY 297 (husband and wife separated shortly after mar-
riage; husband was judicially ordered to pay alimony to wife, which he did
during 13 years; then he tried to obtain a judicial release of his duty which
was denied on the ground that, first, he had to request the return of his wife
in order to live together; seven years after this decision, husband requested
judicially that his wife be ordered to return to live together with him or,
otherwise, that he be allowed to discontinue payment of alimony; wife re-
fused to return; husband petitioned that obligation to pay alimony be ended;
court rejected plaintiff's petition alleging that husband was abusing his rights).
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'A good instance can be seen in a recent Argentine case.
Two adjacent apartments in a condominium building were
offered for sale to the same person. The authorized agent told
the prospective buyer that he could use some space of the
internal corridor which separated one apartment from the
other in order to improve communication between those two
apartments. The buyer decided to buy the two apartments
offered for sale. In accordance to Argentinian law, title does
not pass until a formal deed of conveyance is signed by the
seller and the buyer before a public notary, and duly re-
corded, and title passes only in the manner and to the extent
stated in the deed. The deed failed to make any reference to
the promise made by the seller's agent to the buyer concern-
ing partial use of the internal corridor in order to facilitate
communication between the two apartments. Said internal
corridor was for use by all the owners of apartments which
made up the condominium building. Once the buyer of the
two apartments took possession of them, part of the walls
along the internal corridor were modified linking the two
apartments thereby. The length of the internal corridor was
slightly reduced, from 11.63 meters to 10.63 meters. The own-
ers of the other apartments in the building (who had nothing
to do with the sale because they had no ownership rights in
these apartments) claimed that the internal corridor was part
of the common property of all of the condominium owners,
that the deed of conveyance did not give the buyer any right
or title to occupy part of the internal corridor, and they de-
manded that the wall be demolished. The court found that the
slight change made did not disturb anybody in any manner
whatever, while it was highly beneficial to the buyer. It
found, too, that another owner in the same condominium and
under similar conditions, had built the same type of com-
munication between two adjacent apartments and that the
members of the condominium had not brought any suit
against this owner to have his work demolished. The court
held that the petition by the owners of the condominium was
an abuse of right, because there was no serious and legiti-
mate interest to protect in the instant case.89
89. Diario La Ley, Oct. 22, 1974, case #71031. In 40 REV. LA. LEY 728 the
following case is reported: a film was made by a movie producer in which one
of the characters, a young man of unruly and adventurous life, is given the
surname of a well-known person who in his youth had had a rather frivolous
existence; the character's first name was not the same, but the initial was
and the initial was often used. All of the references in the movie's plot were
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There are numerous cases of a similar nature in French
jurisprudence. 90 The courts have felt, in those cases, that the
to times and places where the real, well-known person, had been. Defendant
alleged that he had not intended to portray plaintiff nor to despise him, that
there was a mere coincidence as to certain secondary elements, and that
events shown by the movie were events entirely alien to plaintiff's biog-
raphy; the court held that naming the film character living a dissolute exis-
tence, with same surname of living well-known person in such a factual con-
text, was abusive; the defendant was ordered to cease the use of such sur-
name in the film; damages were not ordered because plaintiff failed to pro-
duce evidence of any damages of an economic nature.
90. The following few cases will serve to illustrate the point: Civ., July 18,
1893, D.P.III.1894.1.113; Civ.,,May 9, 1905, D.P.1909.1.225 (choice of immovable
for foreclosure of mortgage, when other immovables were available which, if
foreclosed, would not have damaged as much the legitimate interests of
mortgagor, held abusive); Req., November 5, 1923, D.P.III.1924.1.11 (retention
of documents of title by architect whose rights to complete work had been
terminated by State regulation, even though owner of immovable offered to
deposit enough money to meet architect's claim, held abusive); S.1926.1.252
(defendant inadvertently cut plaintiff's tree which had been planted at the
end of lot, near its boundary; defendant immediately offered to properly re-
dress plaintiff; plaintiff refused private settlement and brought suit against
defendant; complaint rejected because it was abusive); Civ., June 17, 1911,
D.P.III.1912.1.150 (plaintiff brought action for the determination of bound-
aries (action en bornage) when it was clear that only a revendicatory action
would lie; by bringing action en bornage, plaintiff was forcing defendant to
incur heavy expenses and engage in time-consuming litigation; held that
even if plaintiff was entitled to recover the immovable, he was obliged to redress
defendant for judicial expenses); Req., July 12, 1870, D.P.III.1871.1.218; Req.,
February 12, 1894, D.P.1894.1.218; Aix, March 15, 1929, D.P.1930.2.111; Trib. Civ.
de la Seine, July 28, 1931, D.P.1934.2.57 (father suspended visits and mail
between his children and their grandparents; held that such a prohibition
would only be valid if there were serious reasons or legal motives for it); Colmar,
June 12, 1970, D.S.1971.J.406 (defendant broke betrothal with plaintiff without
warning, without any reason, even without keeping elementary rules of
courtesy; plaintiff had a child by defendant; held that notice of break of
betrothal by defendant, in a language contrary to tone of recent letters which
had shown warm feelings, and break of betrothal without any solid reasons
therefor, was abusive, making defendant liable to pay damages to plaintiff);
GAZ. DALLOZ, 10-111-923 (lease contract provided that lessee was to appear
personally or by proxy, at place of lessor, for payment of rent; lessee provided
payment by means of a "carte-mandat"; lessor refused to accept payment on the
ground that the contract required personal appearance either by lessee himself
or by his proxy; claim by lessor rejected); D.P.III.1883.2.71; GAZ. PAL. 8.9-1-922
(contract of lease included clause whereby partial or total assignment of the
lease by lessee required prior approval by lessor; lessor refused consent without
any serious or legal motive; refusal held abusive and invalid); S.1965.67
(plaintiff (lessee) sued lessor alleging that defendant refused, without any
reason, to consent to the replacement of old furnace by a new one, to the
[Vol. 35
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
machinery of the state should not be available to those hold-
ers of rights who could not show a legitimate and serious
interest in the exercise of rights, to the detriment of other
persons.
Josserand is of the opinion that this criterion (lack of a
serious and legitimate interest) is the one which has received
the widest support among judges and jurists in civil law
countries, and the one which provides the reasons for most of
the cases in which the exercise of a right has been held to be
abusive. 9 1 If one considers that the first criterion (intent to
harm) can be included in the second one (i.e., the intent to
harm is not a serious and legitimate interest), it is safe to say
that this objective criterion seems to be the most widely used
in civil law jurisdictions.92
Josserand opines that this approach is entirely consistent
with the famous definition of rights by Ihering: rights are
advantage of both the plaintiff, a baker, and the defendant, owner of the
building; the court found that the proposed change was, from a public health
standpoint, to improve the manufacture of goods, would enrich lessor and was
not against any express prohibition in the contract of lease or in the law;
authorization granted by the court because refusal was abusive); Besangon,
June 5, 1957, D.1957.J.605 (minority of shareholders prevented approval by
general meeting of shareholders, of proposed amendment to the Charter,
drafted with the aim of better protecting the rights of the minority
shareholders; no reasons were given by minority shareholders for their at-
titude; held that refusal to approve proposed amendment was abusive and
should not stand); J.C.P.1969.II.15078 (changes brought about in the places
where the servient and dominant lands were located, made useless the exercise
of the servitude rights; intent by owner of the dominant estate to continue
exercising servitude rights held to be abusive, and servitude was to be discon-
tinued).
91. JOSSERAND at 388.
92. There is a very important procedural advantage in the use of this
objective criterion. Whoever seeks recovery of damages caused by abusive
use of rights and has to prove the presence of the intent to harm faces the
troublesome question of producing clear evidence of a psychological process.
This difficulty may defeat the aims which the doctrine of abuse of rights has
sought to achieve. So much is this so that article 226 of the German Civil Code
which expressly accepts the traditional criterion of abuse of rights, is seldom
applied by German courts. It reads: "The exercise of a right which can only have
the purpose of causing injury to another is unlawful" (Wang translation).
Typical cases of abuse of rights have been decided, instead, by application of
article 826 of the same Code, where proof of the intent to harm is not required.
Article 826 reads as follows: "A person who willfully causes damage to another
in a manner contra bonos nwres is bound to compensate the other for the
damage" (Wang translation). See 2 ENNECCERUS, KIPP AND WOLFF, TRATADO
DE DERECHO CIvIL: DERECHO DE OBLIGACIONES pt. 2,665 (1950).
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interests judicially protected. Therefore, if there was no in-
terest, there was no right. Adds Josserand:
Rights are bestowed by the State on a human being tak-
ing into consideration the satisfaction of his interests, not
any interest, but legitimate interests. If these rights are
used for the achievement of that end, they will be legally
protected, even if his exercise may harm other persons,
and it is on this basis that the rule neminen laedit qui suo
jure utitur may be invoked; he may triumphantly answer
to the victim of his action: feci, sed jure fecit, his acts are
licit and they cannot make him liable. It is only'when the
holder of the right exercises his right without any in-
terest, or for the satisfaction of an illegitimate interest
•.. that it can be said that he abuses and therefore ceases to
have the power to request the protection of the laW.93
A group of outstanding civilians in France, such as Sour-
dat, Saleilles, Charmont, Geny, Bardin and Demogue hold and
defend this utilitarian, pragmatic, objective criterion.9 4
(c) Exercise of a Right Against' Bonos Mores (good customs),
or Moral Rules, or Good Faith
French, German, Swiss and Argentine courts, among
others, have refused protection or enforcement when the
exercise of rights runs against some acknowledged general or
accepted principles of good faith, or of positive morality, or a
widely recognized criterion of elementary fairness. Even
where no intention to harm could be proved, if the exercise of
the right is contrary to accepted general customs, or offensive
to known principles of morality or good faith, then such an
exercise of right should not be protected by the courts.
This criterion for the definition of the abuse of rights,
based on rules of positive morality, has been expressly re-
ceived by some civil law codes. The best known instances are
provided by the German and the Swiss Civil Codes. '
Article 826 of the German Civil Code (BGB) reads: "A
person who willfully causes damage to another in a manner
contra bonos mores is bound to compensate the other for the
damages." (Wang translation)
Article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code reads: "Chacun est tenu
d'exercer ses droits et obligations selon les r~gles de la bonne
93. JOSSERAND at 388.
94. Id. at 389.
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foi. L'abus manifeste d'un droit n'est pas protegg par la loi."
(Free English translation: "Every one is obliged to exercise
his rights and perform his obligations in accordance to the
principles of good faith. The law does not protect the manifest
abuse of a right.")
The same -principle is to be found in the Argentine Civil
Code: Its Article 1071 reads: "El ejercicio regular de un derecho
propio o el cumplimiento de una obligacibn legal no puede con-
stituir como ilicito ningimn acto. La ley no ampara el ejercicio
abusivo de los derechos. Se considerar& tal al que contrarie los
fines que aqulla tuvo en mira al reconocerlos o al que exceda los
limites impuestos por la buena fe, la moral y las buenas cos-
tumbres.''95 (Free English translation: "The regular exercise of
'one's right or the performance of a legal obligation cannot make
illicit any :act. The law does not protect the abusive exercise of
rights. Such will be considered the exercise which is contrary to
the ends which (the law) took into account when they (the
rights) were recognized, or the exercise which exceeds the
limits determined by good faith, morals and good customs.")
These provisions are deemed to embody general princi-
ples of the law whereby standards of morality, good faith and
good customs, as lived, accepted and acknowledged by the
people at large, are brought into the picture every time the
courts are called to enforce or to protect rights, or to adjudi-
cate a private conflict of interests.
95. The original text of article 1071 was amended by statute #17711 in
order to make explicit the legal acceptance of the theory of abuse of rights,
which had been questioned by certain legal authors. See SPOTA, 101-83. The
word "regular" was added in the first paragraph between the words "ejer-
cicio" and "de" (in the English translation: between "the" and "exercise").
The second paragraph is new. It expresses the same ideas developed by the
redactors of the Franco-Italian Draft Code of Obligations. Among those re-
dactors were some of the best jurists of France and Italy during the first
three decades of this century: Larnaude, Colin, Capitant, Ripert, Ascoli, Az-
ara, Scialoj a. In accordance to article 74 of the Draft,"... any person shall make
compensation if he causes harm to another by exercising a right in excess of the
limits fixed by good faith or by the object for which the right was conferred on
him."
Article 1185 of the Civil Code of Venezuela is, virtually, a translation into
Spanish of article 74 of the Franco-Italian Draft. Article 1185 reads as follows:
"El que con intenci6n, o por negligencia, o por imprudencia, ha causado un
daft a otro, estd obligado a repararlo. Debe igualment reparaci6n quien haya
causado un daito a otro, excediendo en el ejercicio de 8u derecho, los limites
fijados por la buena fe o por el objeto en vista cual le ha sido conferido ese
derecho."
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In the well known treatise on German Civil Law by En-
neccerus, Kipp and Wolff, the following is stated with refer-
ence to Article 826:
(a) The question whether an action is against good
customs is not to be decided in accordance with the doc-
trines of a philosophical system or the opinion of particu-
lar classes or parties, but in accordance with general
popular conscience ....
(b) As a criterion, neither the refined opinion of the
illustrious thinker, nor the way of thinking and of action
of men of low moral standing even if it were the custom
(rather, the bad usage) of certain circles, could be used. In
order to satisfy the requisites established by the legal
order, only that criterion of moral behavior which, if dis-
obeyed brings about general criticism, can be decisive-
particularly that limitation which we establish ourselves
in the management of our own interests vis-ia-vis the
interests of other parties and which cannot be skipped
without facing disapproval by those persons who have a
sound judgment.9 6
With reference to Swiss law on the same subject, von
Tuhr writes along similar lines:
The exercise of rights, as the law indicates, is subject to
the postulates of good faith, that is to say, those exigen-
cies should be respected which are proper of the cir-
cumstances, and that the holder of the right, correctly
behaving, owes to the interests of the other party.
Otherwise, he will be responsible for an abuse of right,
and will not be protected by the law; the abusive exercise
of a right is an illicit act and obliges him to redress the
damages caused thereby.9 7
With regard to Article 1071 of the Argentine Civil Code,
Borda writes:
•.. It is considered that there is abuse when the exercise
(of the right) runs against the ends taken into account by
the law when said right was recognized, or when said
96. 2 L. ENNECCERUS, T. KIPP AND M. WOLFF, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL:
DERECHO DE OBLIGACIONES pt. 2,666 (1950).
97. A. VON TUHR, TRATADO DE LAS OBLIGACIONEs 270 (1934).
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exercise is contrary to good faith, morals and good cus-
toms.9 8 ...
If the theory of abuse of rights has made headway, it
is due to moral reasons. All the teachings of prestigious
jurists against its admission have become ineffectual
against the feeling of justice which each man lodges in
his heart and which could not tolerate any attempt to
justify under the guise of the law what is arbitrary, im-
moral, or harmful. 99
When one reads the teachings of the most distinguished
jurists who have explained the meaning of the doctrine of
abuse of rights as enacted by the Codes of countries such as
Germany, Switzerland and Argentina, one gets the clear im-
pression that while accepting the doctrine of abuse of rights,
they are looking for objective criteria whereby basic stability
of legal institutions, of vested rights and of protected in-
terests, can be achieved without creating uncertainties which
could jeopardize civil and commercial transactions.
The reference to the principles of good faith, positive
morality, and good customs, indicate their concern with the
identification of practices, ways of being, and standards so
widely accepted and understood, that the discretions of the
judges would become circumscribed.
The reading of cases decided by the application of these
principles provides further evidence of the care with which
the pitfalls of arbitrary or pure discretionary judicial powers
have been avoided. 00
98. BORDA, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL ARGENTINO: PARTE GENERAL
49 (5th ed. 1970).
99. Id. at 45.
100. Citation of a few cases where German Courts applied article 826 of
the German Civil Code in order to impose liabilities on holders of rights, will
serve to show the way the law has worked: 58 R.G.E. 393 (pactum de non
licitando with the purpose of acquiring immovable at a low price, below the
standing balance on a mortgage, held to be against good faith); 50 R.G.
Gruchot 968 (willful nondisclosure of facts which, if known to the other party
would have led to rejection of offer, held to be against good faith); 1906 R.G.
Jur 2.1095 (information which was not truthful was given to third party with
knowledge that it, eventually, would reach a person liable to act thereon,
held against good faith, entailing liability); 115 R.G.E. 415 (transmission of
reports which, although truthful, were exaggerated, held to be against good
faith, entailing liability).
A few Argentine cases where the principle of good faith was applied may
also be useful to illustrate the workings of the concept: Diario La Ley, Oct. 29,
1974, case #71079 (the owner of an apartment in a condominium decided to
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(d) Exercise. of a Right Contrary to the Aims on Account of
Which said Right or Power was Conferred
The famous book by Louis Josserand, De l'esprit des
droits et de leur relativitg: Thgorie dite de l'abus des droits,
published for the first time in 1927, was a very solid, imagina-
tive and forceful attempt to provide a functional criterion for
the identification of exercise of rights which could be consid-
ered abusive and therefore apt to entail civil liabilities.
introduce some important changes in it; although he did not request or ob-
tain any formal authorization by the general meeting of owners, as required
by the law and the regulations in force for the condominium building, the
works began and were for all to be seen and even were the matter of some
comments at certain meetings of owners of apartments of the building; once
the works were completed and the apartment had been remodeled, the own-
ers of the other apartments brought suit alleging that the works had been
done in violation of the law and of the regulations; complaint rejected on the
basis that it was contrary to good faith); Diario La Ley, Oct. 10, 1974, case
#70989 (buyer offered payment of price after several years delay and asked
for the conveyance of title to land; in the meanwhile inflation had seriously
affected purchasing power of contract money; claim by buyer held to be abu-
sive as against good faith); Diario La Ley, June 17, 1974, case #70465 (if the
mortgagee released, by an act of his own free will, apartments mortgaged to
him by mortgagor, diminishing thereby the guarantee provided to him by the
mortgage, he abused his rights if he pretended to execute the mortgage only
against one of the apartments, which had been bought by a bona fide pur:
chaser, who was in possession of the apartment although the deed of con-
veyance of title had not been signed yet).
French case-law also provides numerous instances of the good faith
criterion: Rouen, December 18, 1919, D.P.1920.2.33 (contract of sale of a car
included clause whereby dealer [seller] was not to be held liable to buyer in
case of failure to deliver or in case of delay in the delivery; in either case,
seller's only duty was to return advance payment made by buyer, and no
damages were to be recognized nor paid to the buyer; dealer held liable for
damages); Trib. Comm. de la Seine, December 17, 1924, D.H.1925.282 (main
condition of merger was maintenance of the voting powers of a group of
shareholders; after merger and at a meeting of shareholders, changes were
introduced in the management of their merged corporations rendering inef-
fectual the voting rights of said group of shareholders; decision by the gen-
eral meeting of shareholders annulled); Chambery, August 19, 1927,
S.1928.2.97 (shift of voting powers took place by issuance of a new series of
shares; new issuance held invalid); Civ., February 22, 1968, D.1968.J.607 (les-
sor sued for the full payment of rents due by lessee until the end of the
contractual period of lease; lessee had moved to another city due to a trans-
fer ordered by his employer, and asked lessor to consent to termination of
lease; permission was not granted by lessor; Courts of Appeal decided for
plaintiff; Court of Cassation reversed and remanded, holding that lower court
should determine if lessor, in the exercise of his rights, was inspired by
legitimate motives or, to the contrary, had intended to damage lessee).
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In a nutshell, Josserand's thesis is this: all rights con-
ferred by the law on human beings, on legal persons, are not
absolute; they are relative. They were conferred by the legis-
lator with certain specific aims in mind; those rights, actually,
were means to achieve certain social objectives, and were to be
recognized and enforced only to the extent to which the exer-
cise of the right was compatible with the social functions it had
to perform. If the right was exercised for other objectives or
aims or if it was diverted from its legitimate function, then such
exercise should not be protected by the courts. Whoever exer-
cised the right against its social function was bound to redress
the damages caused thereby, and to demolish, eliminate, or
undo (if possible) whatever was done in an abusive manner to
the detriment of the other parties. 1'0 1
Josserand recalls 0 2 that the principle he propounded had
already been accepted by the Soviet Civil Code, 0 3 the 1934
Polish Civil Code,' °4 the Lebanese Civil Code,' 0 5 and he con-
cludes that French law has finally accepted the same crite-
rion.1 0 6 If this latter statement was true at the time Josserand
101. JOSSERAND at 394-400.
102. Id. at 395.
103. RUSSIAN CIV. CODE art. 1: "Civil rights are protected by the law,
except in those cases in which they are exercised in a sense contrary to their
economical and social purpose."
104. POLISH CIVIL CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 135: "Who intentionally or
by his negligence has caused damage to another while in the exercise of his
rights, is obliged to redress it, if he had exceeded the limits determined by
good faith or by the aim on account of which said right was conferred on
him."
105. The Civil Code of Obligations for Lebanon followed very closely the
teachings of Josserand, who had prepared a draft of it, and the Franco-
Italian Draft Code of Obligations. Article 124 of the Lebanese Code was in-
spired by the well-known formula of the Franco-Italian Draft. Therefore, an
exercise of rights became abusive if it exceeded "the limits determined by
good faith or the aim on account of which such right was conferred." It
should be added that this "functional criterion" has been accepted by the
Venezuelan Civil Code and by the Argentine Civil Code. See note 95, supra.
.106. The following cases may serve to illustrate the point: Paris,
November 14, 1901, D.P.1902.2.238 (father authorized daughter to engage in
business activities, whereupon father entered into a risky business transac-
tion together with her; agreement held to be invalid); Paris, January 5, 1904,
D.P.1905.2.249 (wife executed a legal act without the required authorization
of her husband; husband remained quiet and silent during several years and
then demanded annulment of said legal act alleging his wife's lack of
sufficient authority; after so many years it had become more advantageous
for husband to have the act annulled; claim rejected); Civ. Rej. May 7, 1902,
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was writing almost fifty years ago, it is very doubtful that it
remains truthful today. Pirovano, who has studied the deci-
sions of French courts during recent years, particularly in
the fields of property law and business activities and business
associations, asked himself whether the concept developed by
Josserand had received the type of acceptance which could
have led the courts to restrict the exercise of individual
rights when they were contrary to the social function they
were supposed to perform. His answer is clearly negative. He
feels that, finally, French courts have not accepted Jos-
serand's ideas. He thinks that abuse of rights will be iden-
tified in accordance to the traditional criterion, to wit, that
there is abuse of rights when there is fault in the exercise of a
right.1 0 7 The author does not venture to provide a reasoned
explanation for the judicial attitude of the French judges
today, but he appears to say that the determination of the
social function of individual rights is too complicated a
matter to be put squarely on the shoulders of the judges. He
feels that this is a political question which the judiciary is not
well prepared to tackle and which should be left for discussion
and decision to the legislator. With specific reference to the
question of property and business associations, to which
Pirovano devoted most of his article, he feels that it is not fair
to criticize the judges for failure to enforce the social function
of rights if, after all, that task was not performed by the state
itself. In conclusion, he says:
... it is up to the community as a whole, the determina-
tion a priori, and not only up to the judge a posteriori, of
D.P.1904.1.276 (railway company entered into an agreement with manufac-
turer to provide manufacturer with railway's wagons at manufacturer's sid-
ings, within contractually fixed periods of time; manufacturer requested wag-
ons but railway company refused to provide them; manufacturer suffered
losses thereby; railway company alleged and proved that it was not violating
the agreement concerning number of wagons to be made available within
stated period of time, but railway company knew that its refusal to provide
wagons was going to damage manufacturer, as it did; railway held liable to
pay damages); Paris, May 22, 1965, D.S.1968.J.147 (majority of shareholders of
a corporation decided to suspend performance of contract signed by the cor-
poration with the Chinese People's Republic, at the urging of the U.S. Gov-
ernment; minority of shareholders requested annulment of majority deci-
sion alleging non-performance of contract was contrary to the interests of
corporation; held that the decision of majority was abusive and contrary to
the interest of the corporation).
107. Pirovano, La fonction sociale des droits: R~flexions sur le destin des
thgories de Josserand, in RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, sec. Chronique 67 (1972).
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the social aims of individual rights, if the idea is
accepted-and this may be challenged-that individual
rights may satisfy something else than individual in-
terests.108
As Pirovano says, and the cases we have cited appear to
indicate that, the theory of abuse of rights in France today
seems to follow the tests of "intent to harm" and "lack of
serious and legitimate interests."
The theory so defined keeps broadly in line with the his-
torical antecedents received from Roman and medieval law.
On the other hand, the ideas propounded by Josserand and
his disciples have led several countries to the acceptance of
the criterion which sees an abuse of rights whenever a right
is exercised in a manner contrary to its social function (e.g.,
Argentina, Venezuela). Perhaps it is too early to predict the
way in which the legal texts will be handled by the judges. In
general, one has the impression, by reading cases and com-
ments, that the "social function" test is not the type of rev-
olutionary instrument it was thought to be. However, in this
matter, like in any matter where social behavior occupies
the center of the stage, and where competing ideologies and
principles are still fighting a battle far from being decided, it
seems prudent to pay close attention to legal experience in
order to see which principles and criteria will be chosen for
further development, if any, of the theory of abuse of
rights.109
108. Id. at 70.
109. In its report for the 1950-1951 period, the Commission for the Re-
form of the French Civil Code suggested a very broad wording of the abuse of
rights principle. Its terms were such that the traditional criterion, as well as
the tests based on the "serious and legitimate interest," "good faith," "good
customs," and "social function of individual rights" could be considered to be
included. It reads: "Art. 31. Tout act ou tout fait qui excdde manifestement
par l'intention de son auteur, par son objet ou par les circonstances dana
lesquelles il eat intervenu, l'exercice normal d'un droit, n'est prot~g6 par la loi
et engage eventuellement la responsabilit6 de son auteur. La presente diaposi-
tion ne a'applique pas aux droits qui, en raison de leur nature ou en vertu de la
loi, peuvent 9tre exerca de fagon diacretionnaire" (Free English translation:
Any act or any fact which manifestly exceeds by the intention of its author,
by its object, or by the circumstances in which it took place, the normal
exercise of a right, is not protected by the law and eventually involves the
responsibility of its author. This rule does not apply to the rights which, on
account of their nature or by virtue of the law, can be exercised uncondition-
ally). 6 Travaux de la Commission de RWforme du Code Civil: Annie 1950-
1951, 26 (Sirey 1952).
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VI. ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA
Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. held an oil lease on a tract of land in
the State of Louisiana, adjoining another tract on which
Guaranty Oil Co. held a lease of the same kind. Higgins Oil sank
a well on its tract, and was drawing oil from it by means of a
pump at the rate of some 124 barrels a day, when Guaranty Oil
sank a well on its tract approximately 400 feet from Higgins
Oil's well. Guaranty's well was a dry one and was abandoned.
Through some underground communication it let air into the
radius affected by Higgins' pump, thereby reducing the suction
power of the pump and, as a consequence, reducing markedly its
production. The only thing needed to restore the pumping out-
put at the Higgins' well was a very simple and inexpensive task:
just putting back the plug which had been taken out by
Guaranty Oil Co. Higgins Oil asked Guaranty Oil to do that.
Guaranty Oil refused. Therefore, Higgins Oil brought suit
against Guaranty Oil asking that defendant be ordered to close
its well and to redress the damages suffered by plaintiff. Hig-
gins Oil indicated very clearly: (a) that there was no reason
whatsoever for Guaranty Oil's behavior, since what it was doing
was bringing no benefit to it; (b) that in order to close its well,
Guaranty Oil did not have to engage in expenses or in any kind
of serious effort; (c) that Higgins Oil was being hurt not only
because of the reduced output of its oil well, but also because
other oil wells in the vicinity were drawing oil from the common
oil reservoir to the definitive loss of Higgins Oil.
Defendant introduced an exception of no cause of action
and the exception was sustained by the lower court. Plaintiff
appealed. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana. That happened more than fifty-five years ago." 0
It was a typical case of abuse of rights, where the second
criterion of abuse listed in section V was applicable: the
harmful behavior of Guaranty Oil Co. was not motivated by
any serious and legitimate interest."' This was exactly the
type of business conduct which had been declared abusive by
French courts and apt to engage the liability of its author, in
accordance to article 1382 of the French Civil Code.
The case was of particular interest for Louisiana because
the first paragraph of article 2315 of the Civil Code was virtu-
ally a translation of article 1382 of the French Civil Code.
110. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919).
111. See text section V (b), supra.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana set aside the appealed
judgment and remanded the case for trial at the lower court.
Justice Provosty spoke for the majority and he pointed out
the difficulties of reconciling articles 491, 668, 505 and 667 of
the Civil Code. He said that in order to overcome the prob-
lems and to determine the very fine line of distinction be-
tween what can be 'done and what cannot be done by an owner
when his action' injures his neighbor, it was necessary to
resort to the works of Pothier and Toullier 'whence these
articles were derived by the redactors of the Louisiana Civil
Code. He proceeded to quote from Pothier and Toullier but
found that the latter was not of much help. He decided, then,
to see what the commentators had to say and he found that,
with the sole exception of Demolombe, they all agreed as to
the meaning which should be given to the articles in question.
Justice Provosty quoted from Laurent, Baudry-Lacantinerie
and Chauveau, Carpentier and Du Saint, and he arrived at
the following conclusions:
(a) Cases like the one pending before the court were not
to be: decided by the application of any broad or inflexible
rule, but by a careful weighing of all the 'circumstances at-
tending them, with the aid and guidance of two principles: (1)
that the owner must not injure seriously any right of his
neighbor; and (2) even in the absence of any right on the part
of the neighbor, the owner must not, in an unneighborly
spirit, do things which cause damage to the neighbor while of
no benefit to himself.
(b) Were defendant leaving its well open for some pur-
pose of utility other than the supposed utility of preventing
the drainage of the oil from under defendant's land, a differ-
ent case might perhaps be presented; but the allegation,
which must be taken as true (for the purpose of deciding the
exception of no cause of action) is that leaving the well open
is of no benefit to defendant, while at the same time its
behavior is injurious to plaintiff by depriving it of its right to
pump oil from its underground.
(c) If the defendant's actions were limited to preventing
the oil from escaping from his land to plaintiff's land, the
plaintiff would have no good ground for complaining; but for
all that is known, no oil was being drawn out of defendant's
land, while to a certainty the defendant is directly and seri-
ously interfering with plaintiff's right to operate for oil and is
1975] 1005
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
doing so with no benefit to itself. Therefore, there was a cause
of action for plaintiff.
Thus, in an undisguised language, half a century ago, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana applied the same principles of
the doctrine of abuse of rights to a case involving real rights.
Approximately ten years later, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana decided the case of Onorato v. Maestri.112 Onorato
was a licensed real estate agent, and Maestri and others were
the owners of certain mercantile property in New Orleans,
which they desired to lease. Plaintiff was hired by defendants to
secure a lease for said property. Under Onorato's contract of
employment with defendants, he was to collect a percentage
commission, payable at the time of the execution of the lease.
Onorato secured a lease from a drug company, for a 15 year
term, beginning October 1, 1928. For the first period commenc-
ing October 1, 1928 and ending September 30, 1930, the lessee
was to pay $5,000 per year, at the rate of $416.66 per month. The
first six months were paid in advance.
At the time of the execution of the lease, the defendants
wrote Onorato acknowledging their duty to pay the agreed
commission but, due to the expenses in order to have the prop-
erty ready for its use by the lessee, they asked that they be
allowed to retain the full rent for the first seven months of the
lease (from October 1928 through April 1929) and that they pay
Onorato the full amount of the rent collected for the subsequent
months until the full amount of Onorato's commission be paid.
This proposition was accepted by plaintiff.
On February 27, 1929, at the instance of a creditor, the drug
company was put into the hands of a receiver. On March 16,
1929, the receiver was authorized by the court to pay the rent
under the lease for six months, beginning April 1, and ending
September 30, 1929.
The lease signed by defendants with the drug company
included a clause which read:
Should lessee at any time violate any of the conditions
of this lease, or fail to comply with any of the lessee's obliga-
tions hereunder, or fail to pay the rent or water bill or other
similar charges, punctually at maturity, as stipulated, or
upon the filing of a bankruptcy, receivership or respite
petition by, or the granting by competent authority of simi-
lar petitions against lessee, the rent for the whole unex-
112. 173 La. 375, 137 So. 67 (1931).
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pired term of this lease shall, without putting in default, at
once become due and exigible, and in such event, lessors
shall have the option either at once to demand the entire
rent for the whole term or immediately cancel this lease
without putting lessee in default. 113
Taking advantage of this clause, defendants sued the drug
company on May 28, 1929, to rescind the lease, and on June 18,
1929, judgment was rendered, rescinding the lease.
As the original lease had been rescinded, the receiver, very
shortly thereafter, entered into a lease with defendants expir-
ing September 30, 1929, and, in August 1929, entered into
another contract of lease with defendants for the period begin-
ning October 1, 1929, and ending September 30, 1930. The rent
was the same in these contracts as it was in the contract re-
scinded. Defendants collected all the rent due up to April 1,
1930.
On October 30, 1929, Onorato brought suit to recover
commissions owed him by defendants corresponding to the
period May 1, 1929, up to the date of institution of suit (Oc-
tober 30, 1929). This covered part of the period during which
Onorato claimed that he was entitled to the rents in accor-
dance with his amended contract of employment with defen-
dants. Maestri et al. alleged that the provision in the contract
of lease giving defendants the option to cancel the contract
should a receiver be appointed was a resolutory condition
which, under article 2045 of the Civil Code, had the effect (upon
the accomplishment of the condition) of revoking the lease.
Defendants further alleged that as the receiver was appointed
prior to the time that the rentals were earned (which were
payable to Onorato under their amended contract) they owed
him nothing because Onorato's original contract with Maestri
fell upon the appointment of a receiver or the dissolution of the
lease. Defendants were saying, in effect, that the rents they
collected during the period in which they were payable to
Onorato according to the amended contract, were not rents
coming from the lease made through the intervention of
Onorato, but coming from the lease made directly by de-
fendants with the receiver of the drug company.
Onorato answered saying that it was optional with defen-
dants, under the first contract of lease, either to enforce
113. 173 La. 375, 377, 137 So. 67, 68 (1931).
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payment of the rent or to sue for the- rescission of the con-
tract, and as Maestri et al., by their own free act, brought
about the 'dissolution of the lease by electing to sue for its
rescission, they were responsible for the non-payment of the
rent under the original contract of lease, and 'that defendants
should not be permitted to escape their obligations by taking
advantage' of an option to rescind the contract of lease and
then enter into new leases with the receiver for the same
amount of monthly rent.
Thus,, Onorato v. Maestri presented a. typical abuse of
rights issue relative to the exercise. of contractual rights.. It
was also clear, under the. facts of the case, that there was an
abusive. use of rights meeting the requirements. of the "good
faith" test.114.
The defense raised by defendants was, of course, that. in
rescinding the first contract of lease they were simply exer-
cising their rights under the contract and that article 2040* of
the Louisiana Civil Code ("The condition is considered as
fulfilled when fulfillment of it has been prevented by the
party bound to perform it.") was not applicable whenthe
party exercised a right of his own.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana decided for Onorato. The
Court did not expressly resort to the doctrine of abuse of
rights, nor did it quote French cases of abuse of contractual
rights. It was-hard to apply the first paragraph of article 2315
of the Louisiana Civil Code, because it was difficult.to see fault
in the behavior of defendants. On the other hand, the Su-
preme Court did not have in the Louisiana Civil Code an arti-
cle similar to article 826 of the German Civil Code, or article 2
of the Swiss Civil Code, or article 1071 of the Argentine Civil
Code. However, the conduct followed by Maestri and the co-
defendant, vis-4-vis Onorato was abusive, contrary to -good
faith, utterly unfair. It deprived Onorato, without just cause,
of what he had earned by his broker's. efforts, and which was
legally owed him by defendants.
The Supreme Court felt that the behavior of the defendants
should not be condoned and should not have the protection of
the judiciary. Therefore, it proceeded to-reason byanalogy and
decided the case by application of articles 1856 and 1857 of the
Louisiana Civil Code. Said the Court:
114. See text section V (c), supra.
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. Unquestionably, defendants had a legal right to re-
scind the lease, upon the appointment of a receiver, as
provided in that contract. Had they done so, and nothing
more, or had they rescinded it and leased the premises to
some third person, we should be inclined to hold that plain-
tiff could not recover, at least, to the extent of rents
,collected after the rendition of the judgment of rescission,
as his contract-for payment was dependent on the con-
tinuance of the lease until-he received payment, through
the collection of rents, during a specified period. However,
when the defendants virtually, immediately after the ren-
dition of the judgment of rescission, released the property
to the receiver, for the same rent, they, to all intents and
purposes, reinstated the rescinded lease to the extent of the
periods, named in the leases to the receiver, which cover all
or most of the time in which plaintiff is interested. To per-
mit defendants by this procedure. to be relieved of their
obligation to plaintiff would be to sanction the subjection of
substantive rights to mere matters of form. This view finds
support by analogy, in articles 1856 and 1857 of the Civil
Code.115
These articles contain the following provisions:
Art. 1856:If the violence used be only a legal constraint,
or the threats only of doing that which the party using them
had a right to do, they shall not invalidate the contract....
Art. 1857: But the mere forms of law to cover coercive
proceedings for an unjust and illegal cause, if used or
threatened in order to procure the assent to a contract, will
invalidate it. ..
The analogy seems far fetched. Onorato v. Maestri was not a
case of validity of contract. There was no question that the
contracts between Onorato and the defendants, between the
defendants and the drug company, and between the defendants
and the receiver were Valid contracts. No one ever claimed
annulment alleging duress, violence or fraud. At no time did
any party to any of the contracts act in a coercive manner or
suffer violence.
One of the parties, though, the lessors, acted against good
faith. They were utterly unfair. Their case was unjust. The
115. 173 La. 375, 381, 137 So. 67, 69 (1931)
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cause of their right to evade payment of commission to Onorato
was unjust. The contract made by the defendants with the
receiver was merely a means to achieve an aim contrary to an
elementary sense of good faith.
Though the analogy sought by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in Onorato v. Maestri was a rather distant one, it
was nevertheless a just one. French judges would have pre-
ferred, under those facts, to render decisions applying the
very broad terms of article 1382 (as they have done very
often). They could have argued that one who tried to escape
the fulfillment of his contractual obligations by an artificial
procedure, taking unfair advantage of a contractual clause
devised for a different purpose, was at fault within the mean-
ing of article 1382 of the French Civil Code. Anyway, in
Onorato v. Maestri, justice was done to the parties by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, on the basis of an analogy found
by the Court with a situation of coercion or violence.
In fact, the Supreme Court of Louisiana was deciding a
clear case of abuse of rights and was denying judicial protec-
tion to the holders of a contractual right who were using it to
deprive what was owed to the other party, in a manner con-
trary to good faith.
It could be expected, then, that under the auspices of
these two important cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, the doctrine of abuse of rights would have been
welcomed in Louisiana by judges and lawyers interested in
the control of inequities bound to occur when very general
legal propositions have to be applied to individual cases. The
doors, in matters concerning property rights and contractual
rights, had been widely opened by the Supreme Court.
They were not used. Insofar as "abuse of rights," or
analogies to cases of violence were concerned, Higgins Oil Co.
v. Guaranty Oil Co. and Onorato v. Maestri remained isolated
instances of a judicial attempt to add new instruments for the
judicial control of abusive exercise of individual rights in the
State of Louisiana.
Louisiana has followed the patterns which prevail in the
United States in matters which in civil law countries would
be considered "abuse of rights." In effect, many cases of
abuses of property rights are considered as nuisances, some
as torts, others as abuses of process. There has been, in the
United States, and in Louisiana, a piecemeal step by step
partial approach to problems of lack of good faith, lack of
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serious and legitimate interests, and malice in the exercise of
individual rights.116 But there is no general recognition of the
doctrine. After citing instances of cases and statutes in En-
gland which would lead to results in certain areas of the law
similar to those achieved in civil law countries under the
influences of the doctrine of abuse of rights, Gutteridge had
this to say: "But these are isolated instances of the recogni-
tion of the proposition that a legal right may be abused."' 7
The same may be said about Louisiana. Leake, writing in
1932, said: "No case has been unearthed in this jurisdiction
(Louisiana) which definitely recognizes the abuse of right
doctrine."118 Insofar as the author of this article is aware, the
situation remains substantially the same in 1975.
It is true that in some cases the Louisiana judges have
spoken of "abuse of rights." In the case of Salter v. B.W.S.
Corporation,"9 decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana on
February 18, 1974, Justice Barham speaking about article 667
of the Louisiana Civil Code said: "Civil Code Article 667
creates a legal servitude due one estate from a neighboring
estate. It gives the proprietor of the servient estate the right
to protect and preserve this real right, a servitude. It is an
article designed to protect property from the abuse of the
right of ownership by the works made on a neighboring es-
tate."'120
Article 667 reads: "Although a proprietor may do with his
estate whatever he pleases, still he cannot make any work on it,
which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his
own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him."
The case on which Justice Barham was giving his opinion
involved the use of a tract of land for the underground stor-
age of dangerous chemical wastes. Some of the neighbors
(who were not owners but lessees) were seeking an injunction
to prevent said us6. The court allowed the issuance of a qual-
ified injunction as it might be needed to prevent risks and
dangers for neighbors caused by the eventual leakage of
dangerous chemicals.
116. Leake, Abuse of Rights in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 426 (1933); Gut-
teridge at 30-31; Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (1935); Annot., Billboards
and Other Outdoor Advertizing Signs as Civil Nuisances, 38 A.L.R. 3d 652
(1971); Annot., Spite Fences and Other Spite Structures, 133 A.L.R. 692 (1941).
117. Gutteridge at 30.
118. Leake, Abuse of Rights in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 426, 434 (1933).
119. 290 So.2d 821 (La. 1974).
120. Id. at 825.
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This was not an "abusive" act, an "abuse of right," in tne
sense in which the civilian uses this word. 121 The B.W.S. Cor-
poration was not engaged in the performance of acts under-
taken with an intent to harm, or without any serious and
legitimate interest, or against good faith, good customs or
morality, or against the social objectives on account of which
individual rights are recognized or conferred. It was doing
exactly the opposite. It was peforming a valuable act: the
storage of chemical wastes which if carelessly handled could
endanger the health of many persons. But such storage was
dangerous unless very carefully done. It imposed burdens in
the neighborhood. It might diminish the value of their prop-
erties. Nevertheless, it was not an illegal act; it was not an
abusive act in the above specific sense of the word. 122 It was
an excessive act.
In Devoke v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Com-
pany,123 a railway company had installed facilities for the
firing of its locomotives. Such firing caused soot and heavy
smoke to damage walls, tapestry and carpeting of neighbor-
ing houses. Firing locomotives was an essential part of the
operation of the railway company. It was not an illegal act. It
was not an act inspired by the intent to harm neighbors, nor
was-it done without any serious and legitimate interest, nor
was it an act against good faith, good customs or principles of
morality, nor was it against the social objectives on account
of which rights were recognized by the railway company. for
the operation of its equipment, that is to say, it was not an
abuse of rights. It was an excessive act.
Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code does not make any
distinction between what we call here "abusive" acts and
"excessive" acts. Article 667 was invoked by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in a typical situation of abuse of rights in
Higgins Oil Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co.' 24 It was also invoked by
the same Court in a typical situation of excessive acts as found
in Salter.
The wording of article 667 is very broad. Certainly, as
Justice Provosty indicated, it provides sufficient normative
ground for a judicial holding to the effect that whenever an
owner uses his property with the intent of harming his
121. See text section IV, supra.
122. Id.
123. 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947).
124. 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919).
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neighbors, or without benefit for himself, or without any seri-
ous and legitimate interest, while, at the same time, damag-
ing his neighbors, such owner may be enjoined and ordered
to redress damages. These are cases of abuse of rights which,
under Louisiana law, may be restrained by injunction or sub-
ject to redress.
Besides, as it was certainly indicated in the majority and
minority opinions, in the Salter case, article 667 provides
grounds for remedial action in the case of excessive acts.
In summation, Louisiana courts have spoken in certain
cases of "abuse of rights" when, actually, they were not han-
dling cases of "abuse of rights," but of "excessive" acts. On the
other hand, Louisiana courts have not spoken of "abuse of
rights" when they were really dealing with "abuse of rights"
cases; the situations were checked by denial of the protection
of the law to the owners or holders of credit rights who were
exercising them in such an improper manner, as in Higgins
Oil v. Guaranty Oil and Onorato v. Maestri.
All of the elements needed for the development of the
doctrine of abuse of rights are present in Louisiana. The
norms are articles 2315, 667, 1950, 1958, 2040, 1856, 1857 and
2464 of the Civil Code. The precedents are the Higgins OiZ,
Onorato and Parker cases. As it always happens with the
lines of growth of the law, it is up to the judges and lawyers
to expand the doctrine or to ignore it. So far, in Louisiana,
they have preferred to ignore it. The most pressing needs of
fairness and justice have been dealt with, so far, in a partial
and limited way by the use of different and unrelated legal
remedies (nuisance, abuse of process, torts, public policy re-
strictions, etc.). Has it been enough?
VII. CONCLUSION
Now we may go back to our beginning. The doctrine of
abuse of rights is in the making, it is "infieri." It is an impor-
tant juridical-political element of modern civil law doctrine.
Although there are still pending important questions con-
cerning its scope as well as criteria for the definition of abu-
sive use of rights, this we may safely say now: it will be
difficult for a holder of an individual right, in most of the civil
law jurisdictions today, to exercise such right to the detri-
ment of other parties, just for the sheer sake of exercising it.
At least a "serious and legitimate interest" will have to be
shown in order to justify the exercise of its right.
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